

JPRS-TAC-87-037

8 JUNE 1987



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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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JPRS-TAC-87-037

8 JUNE 1987

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR REVIEWS U.S. BOOK ON SPACE WEAPONS SCIENTISTS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 143-145

[A. Podberezkin review: "Intellectuals on the Road of Madness"]

[Text] A topical feature of international life is the sharply increased attention to questions connected with realization of R. Reagan's "strategic defense initiative". It is natural that concern for the future of mankind is prompting many politicians, scientists and journalists to return to this problem time and again. "The 'star wars' program," the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress observed, "cannot be allowed to be used both as a stimulus to a further arms race and as an obstacle in the way of radical disarmament."

The conclusions set forth by William Broad in the book in question "Star Warriors. A Penetrating Look into the Lives of the Young Scientists Behind Our Space Age Weaponry"** may serve as a good illustration of this proposition. The author--one of the most widely read science correspondents of the NEW YORK TIMES--has on the whole made a conscientious and objective analysis of the essence and possible consequences of the realization of the SDI. "Under the patronage of the strategic defense initiative," he writes, "billions of dollars are being allocated for the development and testing of nuclear weapons.... These could be both electromagnetic pulse weapons and microwave weapons. But they could be even more exotic.... Give the arms manufacturers sufficient money, and they will move heaven and earth" (pp 218-219).

Employing a wealth of factual material (the American journalist met with many politicians and scientists and worked in a number of research centers, including a week in the Livermore Laboratory), W. Broad has prepared an original publication in the form of a meditative diary. It is furnished with a multitude of extracts from official documents and references to the pronouncements of this politician and expert or the other both supporting the "star wars" program and opposed.

Understandably, the author of the book was able to see in the laboratory only what he was allowed to see, and the reader can see for himself here how thick is the veil of secrecy in America over all that is related to the SDI. However, the week of impressions and observations were sufficient for a

conclusion to be drawn as to the tremendous danger which is contained in the U.S. President's initiative and which it is attempted to conceal with arguments about the need to create "absolutely impenetrable defenses". This threat is determined by at least two aspects of the program--military-strategic and military-technical.

From the military-strategic viewpoint (W. Broad arrives at this thought at the end of his work) the SDI means weapons not of defense but attack capable of sharply increasing the likelihood of thermonuclear war. In this connection he calls the readers' attention to the fact that the U.S. Administration has in fact abandoned the declared goals of the creation of an "absolutely impenetrable" ABM system in favor of a far more modest "limited" version thereof. An official White House document which is quoted says plainly that "there is no necessity for providing 100-percent protection". "Offensive missiles," the author himself observes, "remain the core of American policy" (pp 208-209).

In addition, as recent events have clearly shown, U.S. ruling circles are accelerating the creation of the latest types of offensive strategic arms and moving toward outright renunciation of the agreements pertaining to a limitation thereof. Weapons systems specially intended for inflicting a first strike on the territory of the USSR and its allies are being increased at an accelerated pace. These actions of Washington compel the American journalist to acknowledge that the "antimissile shield" which is being created "will never be capable of protection against a concentrated attack but only against a limited one, when the bulk of the nuclear potential (of the USSR--A.P.) has been destroyed as the result of a first strike" (p 210).

Also highly important is the second of the above-mentioned aspects, namely, the United States' attempts by means of a "technological" arms race to achieve a number of most important military-political goals. It needs to be emphasized primarily--and the book calls attention to this repeatedly--that the "star wars" program presupposes not only and not so much even the creation of exotic assault weapons but a broad complex of R&D in respect of the entire spectrum of the most important directions of the development of modern science and technology. Thus speaking about the research being conducted at the Livermore Laboratory, W. Broad emphasizes plainly that work is being performed there on "supercomputers, means of communications and other components of vital importance for the creation of a defensive shield" (p 13). Less than 10 percent of the entire amount allocated for the SDI program is spent, he believes, on the development of strike systems proper--third-generation nuclear arms (primarily the X-ray laser, EMP weapons and so forth) (p 206). The bulk of the resources, on the other hand, is spent in other spheres, whose development is seen as the key condition of the embodiment of the U.S. President's idea. Thus the Livermore physicists are concentrating tremendous efforts on the creation of supercomputers (the so-called S-1 project). It is significant that approximately one-third more employees in the laboratory have been enlisted in its realization than in work on assault space-based systems (p 28).

The thought expressed by the author of the book in connection with the significance of computers within the SDI framework is interesting in this

connection. He believes, with good reason, that the United States' abandonment of efforts to set up an ABM system at the start of the 1970's was caused predominantly by its inefficiency connected primarily with the limited possibilities of the computers available at that time. "The problem was that no projectile could have been launched with an accuracy which would have entailed the destruction of another projectile. The American computers and radars of that time were too primitive for accurately determining the location and training (intercept missiles--A.P.) on fast-flying warheads" (pp 52-53).

Many American scientists agree with this assessment of the significance of computers for realization of the SDI and all of modern warfare. Evaluating the consequences of the Anglo-Argentine conflict, for example, one of them plainly declared: the British "lost a ship and many human lives because they lacked essential possibilities in the computer field. This almost cost them the war." The definite conclusion follows: "I believe that computers are now weapons just as much as nuclear warheads" (p 65).

But creation of the most accomplished computing systems cannot currently, of course, be considered solely a military task. It is a question of a most serious problem--political, economic, technical. In this sense the United States is gambling directly on the preferential development and mass introduction in all spheres of human activity--civilian and military--of the latest computers for the purpose of achieving S&T, economic and military superiority to the USSR.

Thus a wide-ranging search is under way in the United States for types of weapons of mass destruction and military equipment using the latest achievements of the S&T revolution to accomplish a "technological spurt" in the arms race. The propaganda support for such programs proposes attractive packaging--the idea of the "exclusion of nuclear weapons". Playing up to the U.S. President, L. West, a physicist at Livermore, asserts that it is a question of the creation of some "weapons of life".

In fact, however, as the book shows, a dangerous policy of a further increase in first-strike potential and the achievement of "technological" superiority has been adopted.

Also well known is one further "applied" angle of the work on the "star wars" program: attempts to drag the Soviet Union into an arms race which would be beyond the capabilities of its economy. In other words, it is a question of the "economic exhaustion" of the USSR. Significant arguments in this connection of an employee of the Livermore Laboratory may be discovered in the book. The Soviet Union will, allegedly, "be destroyed" as a consequence of tremendous expenditure on the arms race and "find itself technologically left behind" (p 63). In other words, the defenders of the SDI assign our country a secondary role and regard its "technological rolling back" as a condition of their security. As far as the security of the USSR is concerned, it is, to judge from the pronouncements of the mercenary from science, to be wholly and fully dependent on Washington's mood.

This manifestly absurd reasoning is at the basis of the ideology of "technological" chauvinism currently being implanted extensively in the United

States. It would seem that not only certain American scientists, who are simply inadequately informed about the state of Soviet science and the economy, but many politicians also think this way. W. Broad's attempts to ascertain on what such calculations are based are highly significant in this connection. As a result of an analysis which he conducted he reaches the conclusion of the complete groundlessness of the latter. The author's usually restrained tone manifestly fails him here: "Soviet science could not have progressed only thanks to idiots or brilliant madmen. Its possibilities should be evaluated soberly" (p 150). Many examples and the pronouncements of experts evaluating the situation objectively are adduced in evidence. Many of them recognize that in a number of the most important fields of science and technology the USSR "is at the cutting edge" (ibid.).

And one further eloquent fact: in the same Livermore Laboratory there is a special secret department codenamed (Zet), which is staffed by 60 highly skilled specialists. It is engaged in the study of Soviet scientific publications in the field of X-ray lasers and so forth, working, according to W. Broad, in close contact with "top intelligence officials" (p 147).

Thus it is not a question of some mythical "technological backwardness" of the USSR, which, as the author rightly acknowledges, could quickly eliminate the United States' advantages, but of the endeavor of this country's ruling circles to impose on the Soviet Union a new round of the arms race which would encompass all conceivable horizons of the development of science, equipment and technology.

In other words, it is a question of an attempt by Washington to use the latest achievements of the S&T revolution as quickly as possible for its own hegemonist ends and draw the Soviet Union into a military-technical contest in all the main areas of the development of human civilization. The American ruling elite is packaging its aggressive plans in the shining propaganda wrapper of the "strategic defense initiative". W. Broad formulates his viewpoint quite definitely in the concluding part of his interesting work: "The week spent in conversation in the laboratory convinced me that the critics' (of the SDI--A.P.) claims are, on the whole, correct." Realization of the President's project would lend impetus to a new costly round of the arms race, which "would make the world a more dangerous place to live. Such a step would increase the risk of an outbreak of war" (p 212).

FOOTNOTE

1. William J. Broad, "Star Warriors. A Penetrating Look into the Lives of the young Scientists behind Our Space Age Weaponry," New York, Simon and Schuster, 1985, pp 245.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: REPORTS, COMMENTS ON OPENING OF EIGHTH ROUND

Reagan Speech

PM061423 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "U.S. President's Speech"]

[Text] Washington, 2 May -- President Reagan has addressed Republican Party members at an election fund-raising dinner as part of the 1988 presidential election campaign, which is now being launched in the United States. Touching on questions under discussion at the Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range missiles in Europe, the head of the White House noted the "indisputable progress" that has been made in "reducing nuclear armaments, which threaten mankind."

At the same time he asserted that "the defense of peace is one of the United States most important goals in international affairs." His speech makes it clear, however, that the Washington administration intends to achieve this goal by using...the "Strategic Defense Initiative," which, as is well known, envisages a new and very dangerous round of the nuclear arms race and its transfer into space.

The U.S. President also touched on the SDI problem in written replies to questions from Japan's ASAHI SHIMBUN newspaper. He confirmed the White House's firm commitment to the "Star Wars" program, which has become the main obstacle to the conclusion of a strategic arms agreement. Reagan asserted that "it makes sense" to continue work on SDI and at the same time to hold talks on strategic arms reduction. The White House is using that stance to conceal the attempts to create a "space shield" for the United States and, at the same time, to weaken the other side's potential for delivering a retaliatory strike.

The President also pointed out that the talks and discussions U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz held in Moscow "strengthened prospects of concluding an interim agreement on medium-range facilities." He noted, however, that "important problems remain to be resolved, particularly on shorter-range INF [RSD menshey dalnosti] and verification measures." The head of the Washington administration announced that the United States is continuing "intensive consultations" on this question with its allies in Western Europe and Asia, including Japan.

Vorontsov Comments

LB042205 Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 4 May 87

[Text] The Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons are resuming in full-scale form on Tuesday. The medium-range missile group gathered earlier, on 23 of last month, to start drafting a treaty on the elimination of this type of weapons in Europe. The chief Soviet delegate Yuliy Vorontsov, said upon his arrival in Geneva that the Soviet Union believed that the treaty could be prepared already in the course of the current eighth round.

'Real Chances' for Accord

LB051132 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 5 May 87

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Konstantin Patsyuk]

[Text] Another round -- the eighth -- in the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments began in Geneva today. At the center of attention is the question of concluding a treaty on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. It must be said that on this question real chances exist for reaching an accord, and for doing so before the end of this year.

In connection with the resumption of the talks the White House has published a statement by U.S. President Reagan saying that the White House chief has instructed the U.S. representatives at the talks to step up efforts aimed at achieving agreement on reducing strategic armaments. The United States is shortly to present a relevant draft treaty proposing a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments over a 7-year period following the documents coming into force. It is also proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States should remain within the framework of the ABM Treaty only until the end of 1994. The document envisages that work will continue on the development [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of systems of the Strategic Defense Initiative; and that after 1994 both sides, as the draft says, will be able to deploy defense systems as they choose if no other reciprocal accord has been achieved.

How is this proposal, envisioned by the draft treaty, to be understood? Well, it means that while holding talks the United States will simultaneously prepare for the deployment of space defense weapons. And finally, one's attention is drawn to the fact that the draft again raises questions concerning inspection and verification [proverka i kontrol] for the achievement of an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. In fact, as is known, our country has already put forward detailed proposals in this field that have, moreover, been left unanswered.

There are more than enough statements being made in the West about the willingness to solve the disarmament problem and to prevent war. President Mitterrand of France has stated, for example, that his country wants to create the conditions for solving disarmament problems and is even taking steps toward this. But the public receives statements of that kind with mistrust. The fact is that words are one thing, but what is needed are concrete actions to back them up, and these actions are lacking. France itself -- judging by its what leaders have said -- has received our proposals on medium range missiles in Europe in a very guarded way and has not taken a precise stance on this question.

Vorontsov, Kampelman Meet

LD051248 Moscow TASS in English 1231 GMT 5 May 87

[Text] Geneva May 5 TASS -- The eighth round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments began here today with a meeting between Yuliy Vorontsov, head of the USSR delegation, and Max Kampelman, top negotiator for the U.S. side.

The Soviet side is known to have tabled during the negotiations a draft treaty on eliminating the medium-range missiles of the USSR and the United States in Europe. The Soviet draft is a practical embodiment of the formula for the solution of the problem of the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) agreed upon at the Reykjavik meeting and reiterated by both sides during the talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow. There exists a real possibility to work out a joint draft treaty on INF before the end of the current year. The Soviet side is prepared for this work.

During the round the sides will also continue the discussion of issues pertaining to preventing the spread of the arms race into space and drastic reductions in strategic offensive armaments.

Reagan Statement Criticized

LD051536 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 5 May 87

["Invitation to 'Nuclear and Star Games'" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

U.S. President Ronald Reagan said in his statement ahead of the 8th round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms that he had directed the U.S. delegation in Geneva to intensify its efforts there and that the United States was "well prepared for hard bargaining" and "resolved to do our part".

However, the results of the preparatory work, as detailed by the President, can hardly be seen positively.

One is apt to note first of all that in Washington they are changing the objective order of priorities.

It is known to the whole world that just millimeters are left to cover to reach an agreement on medium-range and theater missiles. It is likewise known that the ball in this game is in the U.S. court.

Yet, the President in his statement pushed this problem, which is ripe for a mutually acceptable solution, to the background, while proclaiming a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms to be the "number one" objective.

The White House chief also asserted that the relevant draft treaty the American delegation was going to table in Geneva would reflect the agreements reached in Reykjavik.

But the understanding in Reykjavik was for destroying strategic offensive arms completely over ten years, with a 50 percent cut in their armories within the first five years of this period.

In Washington now they have "forgotten" both about eliminating these weapons completely and about the ten- and five-year periods.

The only thing remaining is a 50 percent cut, and even that is to be effected over seven rather than five years.

Moreover, the U.S. side has also returned -- contrary to the Reykjavik understanding -- to its demand for "sublimits" on forces making up the strategic "triad", which is aimed at wrecking the structure of the Soviet strategic forces and winning advantages for the United States at the negotiating table.

The "new" U.S. position on space arms looks even less attractive.

In Reykjavik the U.S. President agreed to an accord not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for ten years, that is the period for scrapping strategic offensive arms completely.

Now he is talking about merely seven years through 1994 and about destroying half rather than all strategic offensive arms. After 1994, according to his proposal, either side could deploy space arms.

What is being offered to the Soviet Union thus is burying the ABM Treaty, even if with a seven-year respite, while preserving half of the current arsenals of strategic offensive arms.

What would this proposal lead to, if accepted?

The answer was given by the U.S. President himself when he said in March 1983 that if defensive space weapons were coupled with offensive systems, they could be seen as a factor for aggressive policy.

The U.S. proposals can only be described as an invitation to "nuclear and star games" and to involvement in working out the rules for "Star Wars".

So far as the medium-range missile is concerned, Washington, instead of giving a constructive response to the latest Soviet initiatives in the field, is talking about the alleged "insufficiency" of the Soviet proposals on verification, although the Soviet draft agreement offers a solid basis for hammering out the final text of a Soviet-U.S. treaty at the talks.

One is also surprised that the President has not been informed -- or such at least is the impression -- of the substance of the Soviet proposal which provides for destroying the U.S.-controlled nuclear warheads for Pershing-1A missiles belonging to West Germany.

Although the matter at issue is U.S. warheads rather than West German missiles and Launchers, the White House chief fumed about what he alleged were "Soviet efforts to include the missiles of countries other than the United States and the USSR.

The Soviet Union -- and this is known by the entire world -- has taken a whole number of constructive steps and cleared many logjams from the path to agreements in Geneva.

Washington, by contrast, has demonstrated the lack of even a basic desire to consolidate the gains already made on the path to mutually acceptable solutions based on the principle of equality and equal security.

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CSO: 5200/1469

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD DETAILED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 3-12

[Article by O. Bykov: "New Concept of Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text]

I

A hitherto unprecedented threat looms over mankind: in the event of the outbreak of nuclear war, not only the mutual annihilation of the belligerents but also the loss of the entire human race and even life itself on our planet are inevitable. The colossal destructive capacity of modern weapons and the ineluctable globally disastrous consequences of their use leave no one with any hope of survival. There is no effective means of protection against the danger of mass extermination. Salvation from catastrophe is to be found only in the elimination of the weapons capable of wiping out civilization.

The uniqueness of the current situation imperatively demands a fundamental reconsideration of the traditional notions of war. What is needed is a new philosophy of peace and disarmament taking into consideration the ominous realities of the present day and designed to be a reference point for the assertive, immediate, joint actions of peoples and states in the name of averting a disaster such as would be without precedent in the history of human society and which would be the final chapter of its history.

The mortal danger could be nipped in the bud. Forty years ago, back on the threshold of the nuclear era, the Soviet Union presented a prudent and farsighted proposal--banning the use of atomic energy for military purposes, averting a dangerous and ruinous nuclear arms race and making warfare with the use of weapons of mass destruction impossible. But the ruling stratum of the United States opted for a different path, to which it was prompted by the tenets of the "policy of strength" and imperial ambitions. It converted the qualitatively new weapons into the main means of pressure on the USSR and the achievement of dominating positions in the world. Intoxicated with the illusion of omnipotence, the most bellicose American politicians and strategists hoped with the aid of the "absolute weapon" to destroy socialism and forcibly turn back historical development.

Such designs were not destined to be. The nuclear arms race unleashed by Washington did not produce for it decisive superiority. By a tremendous exertion of its powers the Soviet Union was able to parry the challenge that had been thrown it in the sphere of military competition--it at first deprived the United States of its nuclear monopoly and then the invulnerability of its territory and ultimately reached the level of military-strategic balance with the United States. The aggressive imperialist forces' hopes of victory in a nuclear war proved groundless.

The approximate equivalence of military forces put international security on a firmer foundation. However, the balance that has been achieved is not an end result but merely a necessary stage in the struggle for the removal of the nuclear threat. Even within the framework of the parity, which has evolved it is difficult to control the rapid development of military technology. The continued stockpiling and upgrading of nuclear weapons is fraught with unpredictable consequences for strategic stability and increases the likelihood of the outbreak of a world-incinerating conflagration.

The objective community of security interests dictates the need for the formulation and implementation of a new concept--one of transition from military-strategic balance to a nuclear-free world. What is required for this is a renunciation not only of the decrepit cliches of power confrontation but also of the long discredited stereotypes of the futile counterposing of knowingly unacceptable positions at the arms limitation negotiations. A decisive change in political thinking toward a search for practicable paths toward detente and disarmament is a vital necessity.

To secure a turn for the better on the international scene the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Soviet Government adopted a decision at the start of 1986 on a number of major foreign policy actions of a fundamental nature. Their purpose was to contribute to the maximum to an improvement in the atmosphere, overcome the confrontational trends, clear the way toward a winding down of the arms race on earth and the prevention thereof in space, reduce the military danger and strengthen mutual trust.

A wide-ranging set of foreign policy initiatives was put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his statement of 15 January 1986. They represent an organic blend of the new philosophy of general security and a radical formulation of the tasks of disarmament. At the center of the proposed measures is a specific, state-by-stage program of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

The Soviet program of nuclear disarmament, historic in scale and significance, was a substantial contribution to a fundamental restructuring of political thinking in the sphere of international relations. Its realization would open to mankind a fundamentally new period of development and afford a realistic opportunity for escape from the vicious circle of confrontation and transition to cooperation for the sake of the accomplishment of constructive tasks.

The vital need for disarmament as the main component of international security was confirmed by the 27th CPSU Congress. Realization of the program of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and removal of the military threat

advanced in the 15 January 1986 statement is to be, as the congress determined, the central direction of the USSR's foreign policy for the coming years.

A specific expression of the Soviet Union's new approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament was its position at the top-level Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik 11-12 October 1986. The bold, large-scale proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev were based on the principles of equality and equal security and took account of the interests of the USSR and the United States, their allies and the peoples of all states. The Soviet side's position revealed a prospect of accord on such most important issues as a 50-percent reduction in, and subsequently the complete elimination of strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles in Europe. The achievement of these goals would pave the way toward a radical improvement in the international atmosphere, removal of the nuclear threat and the development of the peaceful cooperation of all members of the world community.

The outcome of the meeting in Reykjavik was ambiguous. It was poisoned by the distress of disappointment--it was not possible to embody the broad consent which had practically been reached in mutually binding accords. This was prevented by the U.S. Administration's devotion to the plans for "star wars" and its stubborn reluctance to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament by way of strengthening the ABM process and adopting the appropriate commitments identical for both sides.

At the same time the unusual nature and genuine novelty of the negotiations in the Icelandic capital were expressed in the fact that study of the problems of nuclear disarmament was raised to a considerably higher level. A wide road ahead, toward a radical reduction in nuclear arsenals--as far as their complete elimination--was opened. Unswervingly advancing along this main highway is the sole reasonable option for the USSR and the United States and for all mankind. It is determined not by pious wishes or considerations of one-sided advantages but by the objective universal need for survival in the nuclear age and mutual and general interest in a removal of the danger of self-annihilation.

II

The Soviet-American top-level meeting in Reykjavik revealed a "common denominator" of interests which for the first time adequately reflects the nature and scale of the real threat looming over both the USSR and the United States and the whole world. It was expressed in a mutual understanding that under current conditions the reliable mutual security of the USSR and the United States and, along with it, international security as a whole is possible primarily on the paths of nuclear disarmament.

The course of the Soviet-American dialogue throughout recent decades has led to this realistic conclusion. Recognition of the interdependence of security interests began to blaze a trail for itself in the 1960's. The first steps were taken at that time toward a curbing of the arms race, primarily the banning of nuclear weapons tests in three environments. The 1970's brought mutual recognition of the need to be guided by the principle of peaceful

coexistence in relations between the USSR and the United States. Agreements were concluded on a limitation of strategic offensive arms and antimissile defenses. The first half of the 1980's, unfortunately, was marked by the actual disruption of the process of the formulation of mutually acceptable decisions. Leading circles of the United States preferred a spiral in the arms race, increased levels of confrontation and a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union, rather than a search for ways of disarmament.

However, ignoring the imperatives of the nuclear opposition means not only being at odds with the demands of general security but also jeopardizing one's own interests. However great the temptation to gain the upper hand in the confrontation, it is sooner or later necessary to return to the search for reasonable compromise, particularly if the other side expresses a serious readiness for this.

The appearance in U.S. policy of signs of realism did not go unanswered on the part of the USSR. A meeting of the leaders of the two countries became possible. The negotiations between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Geneva 19-21 November 1985 culminated in the adoption of a joint document, which declared: nuclear war must not be unleashed, it could have no winners. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the United States could have catastrophic consequences, the sides emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them--nuclear or conventional. They mutually undertook not to aspire to the achievement of military superiority.

The leaders of both states agreed that the work of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms be accelerated, referring to the accomplishment of the tasks set in the Soviet-American joint statement of 8 January 1985, namely: prevention of an arms race in space and a halt thereto on earth, limitation and reduction in nuclear arms and a strengthening of strategic stability.

From Geneva the path lay toward new top-level meetings and the formulation of specific accords based on the mutual understanding that had been reached. The Soviet Union went more than half-way. Its major, out-of-the-ordinary initiatives, at the center of which was the comprehensive disarmament program, contributed to a large extent to the construction of stable security based on reciprocity. However, instead of a reciprocal movement toward disarmament, the U.S. Administration continued the development of militarist programs, with particular emphasis on the SDI. The Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms idled. Precious time was being lost, and no progress toward accords was in sight.

Under such conditions the Soviet leadership adopted a decision which was equivalent to a major conceptual breakthrough in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in terms of its significance. Having proposed an immediate top-level meeting in Reykjavik, the Soviet Union submitted there, not individual questions of arms limitation, but an integral package of radical proposals pertaining to the central set of problems of nuclear disarmament.

It would, of course, be unfounded to counterpose radical measures to individual, partial ones. The latter also are capable of markedly improving

the political climate and strengthening mutual trust. But in the current situation they are inadequate. Only deep cuts in nuclear arms can fundamentally improve Soviet-American relations and the whole atmosphere in the world. Only large-scale interconnected measures are capable of touching the very core of international security.

The breadth and boldness of the USSR's new approach to problems of nuclear disarmament were not a manifestation of some maximalism. On the contrary, granted all their radical nature, the Soviet package of proposals was distinguished by a strict realistic approach, comprehensive balance, consideration of the sides' concerns and an orientation toward a search for compromise. It was essentially a package of accords for it correctly and fully reflected the balance of interests of the sides' security which has objectively evolved in the strategic sphere. It was for this reason that it proved possible in Reykjavik to approach directly a global solution of the central problem--winding down the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States. On the basis of this fundamental mutual understanding, it was possible to bring the sides' positions closer together on a number of key components of the package.

First, assent was reached on reducing strategic offensive arms by half over 5 years and on completely eliminating the remaining elements of ground-, sea- and air-based strategic forces in the subsequent 5-year period.

Second, leaving aside the question of the nuclear potentials of Britain and France, the sides agreed to reduce to zero American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe given a reduction to 100 warheads on Soviet missiles in the Asian part of the USSR with the right for the United States to have the same number of warheads on medium-range missiles on its territory. In addition, agreement also emerged on a start on negotiations concerning missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km, existing levels of which would have been frozen.

Third, on the question of strategic defenses fundamental mutual understanding was also recorded concerning the fact that the sides would not withdraw within 10 years from the ABM Treaty. However, the way toward a further rapprochement of positions was tightly blocked off by the American side's unwillingness to limit work on the SDI program.

Fourth, the possibility of progressing toward a complete ban on nuclear testing, in the course of negotiations at which it would have been possible also to discuss interim solutions of a limitation of nuclear explosions in terms of yield and number and the 1974 and 1976 treaties, opened up a little.

The question of verification arose from a new angle in the course of coordination of problems of the nuclear-space complex. Embarking on a specific stage of elimination of nuclear weapons, the sides reached an understanding that verification should not only be an organic component of disarmament but also be tightened up to the utmost. The Soviet side advocated triple verification--national, bilateral and multilateral--which would ensure complete mutual confidence in security. As a result the question of verification, which had always been a stumbling block, was practically settled to the sides' mutual satisfaction.

Thus almost everything contained in the Soviet package was agreed, except for the question of SDI and, partially, nuclear testing. And although the American side thwarted a truly historic agreement, when it was literally a handshake away, it is hard to exaggerate the permanent, fundamental significance of the understandings which were reached.

The meeting in Reykjavik showed the efficacy of the large-scale, essentially political formulation of the question of nuclear disarmament. It is thus that it is necessary to think and act in the interests of accomplishing the central task--preventing nuclear catastrophe and ensuring reliable international security.

Without a high-minded, innovative approach and without mutual political will, escaping from the labyrinths of expert collations of an innumerable multitude of technical details, fruitless debate over numbers and vain quests for ideal formulas of balancing each component in the opposed nuclear forces is inconceivable. Even granted a mutual desire, it is difficult building an edifice of accord from fragmented blocks of various sizes if there is no concerted plan and general timetable for the construction.

The rapprochement of positions in Reykjavik was possible primarily because the sides moved to the high political level of solution of the problem. The futile routine of technical casuistry with all its levels and sublevels, limits and sublimits gave way to the simple and effective logic of radical nuclear disarmament. Within the framework of a global solution subordinated to the main political goal--a lessening of the danger of mutual and general annihilation--it proved not that difficult to negotiate the order of priority of practical steps leading to the elimination of nuclear arms within a specific timeframe.

In the event of coordination of all problems of the nuclear-space complex, the top leaders of both countries could have instructed the participants in the negotiations in Geneva to embark on formulation of the wording of specific documents based on the basis of the understanding that had been reached in principle, and the advancement of political provisions of future agreements with the necessary technical details. It stands to reason that the technical aspect would no longer be self-sufficing here but would merely assist the implementation of joint political decisions.

It by no means follows from what has been said that fitting technical details would be easy, automatic, virtually. Even given the most favorable conditions, a quest for the practical accomplishment of many difficult problems is necessary. It is sufficient to cite, for example, the problem of ensuring equality and equal security in the course of the stage-by-stage winding down of the two sides' nuclear arsenals, which are dissimilar in terms of composition and structure. However, such difficulties are entirely surmountable if it has been possible to reach a decision on striving jointly for the set goal.

III

The Reykjavik model of a political solution of the problems of nuclear disarmament serves as an effective method of finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining knots of disagreements and consistent progress toward the conclusion of agreements. It was such a constructive approach which determined the main content of the Soviet document "Key Provisions of Agreements Between the USSR and the United States in the Nuclear Disarmament Sphere Subject to Further Preparation for Signature". This draft of a kind of "framework understanding" was presented by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze at the meeting with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in Vienna 5-6 November 1986. At the negotiations in Geneva the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted on 7 November 1986 specific interconnected proposals on all aspects of the problem of nuclear and space-based arms. The Soviet documents set forth the main parameters of understandings pertaining to all four areas of the negotiations on the nuclear-space complex as defined at the Reykjavik meetings and outlined approaches in order to surmount existing differences.

This applied primarily to the central point of the disagreements--the question of the SDI. For the purpose of providing for a way out of the impasse the Soviet side once again displayed flexibility and constructiveness. It did not insist on a suspension of all the research being conducted in accordance with the SDI program, on condition that it not go beyond the laboratory framework. Only the testing of the space-based components of antimissile defenses in near-Earth space were subject to prohibition. Over the next several years, and in the course of negotiations, the sides could find further mutually acceptable solutions in this sphere. It was also proposed beginning high-level negotiations in the very near future for the purpose of determining which kind of work on antimissile weapons is permitted by the ABM Treaty, and which not.

The Soviet side submitted an important new proposal on a question directly abutting the space arms sphere. The reference was to accords being found pertaining to a ban on antisatellite weapons. The development of such weapons could open a wide channel for circumventing a ban on the creation of space-based antimissile weapons systems, and for this reason it is necessary to close off this channel before it is too late.

The main thing, however--and the Soviet proposals pertaining to various technical aspects of the problem of strategic defenses were subordinated to this--was the high-minded political approach to the very idea of the SDI. It was emphasized with all clarity and unambiguity here that the interests of the sides' mutual security demand not antimissile defenses but the elimination of those same weapons against which such defenses are contemplated. For this reason mention was made once again of the permanent significance of the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration and the need for strict compliance with all its provisions. In order to preclude the possibility of a disturbance of the balance as deep cuts in nuclear arms are implemented, the proposal that an understanding be arrived at that the USSR and the United States would not within a period of 10 years avail themselves of their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty was confirmed.

Nonetheless, the U.S. Administration remains in the grip of illusions concerning the role and place of the SDI in the system of strategic confrontation. This purely technical program has been elevated to the level of high conceptual significance--both as a "new principle" of protection against nuclear weapons and as virtually the philosophy of transition from a nuclear world to a nuclear-free world. It is being presented as some kind of unorthodox revelation, although it essentially represents the deformed outcome of old political thinking.

The primordial intention of the SDI itself is profoundly fallacious. Under the conditions of strategic parity a technical solution of the political problem of security cannot be found. Both cover with the aid of antimissile defenses in the event of nuclear war and the use of a space shield for to protect the delivery of a disarming first strike are unrealistic. Nor is the SDI any use at all as "insurance" for the period that offensive nuclear arms are being eliminated. Preparations for "star wars" could not insure but undermine and destroy the entire process of nuclear disarmament. And it is by no means to assist the dismantling of nuclear arsenals that the U.S. military-industrial complex has clutched so tightly at the SDI. It needs this militarist program because it hopes with its help to derive over coming decades tremendous profits from the general spiraling of the arms race--space-based, nuclear and conventional--at a qualitatively higher technical level, what is more. The most reactionary and bellicose circles of the United States and certain other imperialist states have tied themselves so closely to the SDI because they see it as a powerful catalyst of a total confrontation with the forces of peace and progress and the principal obstacle to nuclear disarmament.

The devotees of a space shield are putting their egotistic interests higher than international security and ultimately the security of America itself. Proving to them the danger of such a senseless position is extremely difficult--impossible rather. But in the United States itself and throughout the world there is still sufficient political wisdom to refrain from the fatal step leading to the transfer of the arms race to space.

Prudence also dictates the adoption as a matter of principle of a decision pertaining to another question left nanging following Reykjavik. It is the question of nuclear testing.

The Soviet Union has been and remains a decided and convinced supporter of an immediate and complete prohibition of this. It was for this purpose that it consented to a unilateral suspension of all nuclear explosions and called on the United States to join this action. Extending its moratorium time after time over 18 months, the USSR demonstrated in practice the possibility of the adoption of effective measures capable of putting barriers in the way of the nuclear arms race. However, Washington failed to follow the Soviet Union's example and continued to carry out a program of nuclear tests.

Under such conditions the USSR could not indefinitely show one-sided restraint without detriment to its own security. It was forced to adopt the decision on a cessation of the moratorium following the first U.S. nuclear explosion in 1987. If the United States ceases testing, the USSR will be prepared on the basis of reciprocity to halt immediately the realization of its own program.

Simultaneously the Soviet leadership proposed on immediate start on full-scale negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear testing. The USSR expressed a readiness here to negotiate also the stage-by-stage accomplishment of this task, referring to the ratification of the Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976 and the imposition of interim restrictions on the number and yield of nuclear explosions.

The current categories of political thinking demand the maximum restraint in the strategic sphere. Progress toward nuclear disarmament is impossible without it. An example is being set by the Soviet Union: not succumbing to the flagrant provocations of the opponents of disarmament, it is as yet refraining from withdrawal from the SALT I and SALT II Treaty limitations in order to preserve these key inhibitors of the strategic arms race. The Soviet side believes that there is still a possibility of halting the dangerous development of events which the U.S. Administration is bringing out by its irresponsible actions.

In the complex situation which is taking shape mutual restraint naturally constitutes only a minimal demand. The main thing is progress in the line of ascent of the positive process whose starting point was the Reykjavik meeting. The political will for nuclear disarmament is capable not only of paving the way toward specific mutually binding accords in this sphere. It can and must serve as a powerful stimulus for the just as large-scale formulation of other problems of disarmament and military detente--among these, primarily a significant reduction in armed forces and conventional arms.

Guided by the new political thinking, the USSR and its allies have already put this urgent problem on a practical footing. At its meeting in Budapest 10-11 June 1986 the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee addressed to the NATO states and all European countries a program of an appreciable reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on the territory of all of Europe--from the Atlantic to the Urals. The successful completion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe is contributing to the development of this large-scale initiative. Stockholm I will lead to Stockholm II--to measures of real disarmament on the European continent. Vigorous interaction in the broad political plane of the two processes--nuclear and conventional disarmament--will become a powerful factor of removal of the nuclear threat.

IV

After Reykjavik the struggle against the menacing catastrophe has reached a qualitatively new frontier. Nuclear disarmament, which only recently seemed merely a dream and a matter for the distant future, has now been put on the firm ground of political realism and acquired the outlines of a specific program which is practically feasible within a short period of time. A process of rethinking current reality and a quest for mutually acceptable solutions of the problems of general disarmament has been stimulated.

The prospect of a nuclear-free world does not, perfectly understandably, suit the forces which derive benefits from the continuation and further excitation of total confrontation. The conglomerate of opponents of disarmament has

united in its ranks reactionaries of all stripes--from representatives of the immediate entourage of the U.S. President, the government machinery and the Congress through ultraright groupings, the big wheels of military business and fierce militarists from the Pentagon and NATO staffs. They include new-fangled "globalists" and moss-backed "Atlantists," anticommunist fanatics and professional specialists in diverting attention from domestic upheavals like "Irangate" by means of playing up the imaginary "danger from outside," champions of a "strong America" and speculators in fear in the face of the loss of jobs should military production wind down. For the sake of their selfish interests--both long-term and, frequently, market-related--all these adherents to the old way of thinking are stubbornly unwilling to abandon the gamble on nuclear weapons and a policy of strength. They are fanning an atmosphere of hostility, rejecting the very possibility of the achievement of agreements and directly and indirectly shaping the confrontational direction of Washington's official policy and also that of certain of its allies.

The positive results of the meeting in the Icelandic capital brought about a sharply negative reaction on the part of rightwing political circles of the West. In the United States and West Europe certain figures, terrified by the very possibility of a radical lowering of the level of nuclear opposition and an improvement in the international atmosphere, have adopted a policy of discrediting the Reykjavik understandings and efforts toward their actual dismantling.

Immediately following the meeting the U.S. Administration began to retreat from the high frontiers of agreement which had been scaled there. Many accords were subjected to high-handed revision, arbitrary abridgment and dilution by a multitude of reservations, conditions and one-sided interpretations. Things went as far as Washington beginning to call in question even the fundamental, pivotal understanding on the elimination of the strategic nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States.

Of course, it is in the power of the leaders of American policy to attempt to cross out the results of Reykjavik. But it is given to no one to "abrogate" the realities of the strategic situation and the interdependence of the security interests of the two sides and the international community as a whole conditioned by them. One may choose to gamble stubbornly on preparations for "star wars," undermine the ABM Treaty, destroy the treaty-legal structure of SALT and exceed its restraints for the sake of an unchecked nuclear arms buildup. But it is impossible seriously to hope here to "extricate" oneself from the rigid framework of strategic parity and achieve decisive military superiority. This the USSR will never allow. It has sufficient opportunities opportunely and effectively to neutralize the United States' attempts to obtain tangible military advantages, whether in the sphere of strategic offensive arms or the creation of space-based arms.

But this is not what the Soviet Union would want. Restoring a balance that has been disturbed is incomparably more difficult and burdensome than maintaining it in the current state and, even more, imparting to it growing dependability by means of limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals. By its very nature the strategic equation cannot become more stable by ascending the spirals of a qualitative and quantitative buildup of its components. An expansion of the

scale, acceleration of the pace and complication of the entire system of "action--counteraction" of military competition will inevitably lead to the shattering of strategic stability--the basis on which the process of ensuring international security and progress toward real disarmament relies.

If one forswears the tenets of confrontation and is guided not by narrow self-interest but considerations of the big perspective, by the simple instinct of self-preservation even, it has to be seen that America's true national interests also demand not a spiraling but a winding down of the arms race. And in this sense the concept of nuclear disarmament which the U.S. President adopted in Reykjavik was by no means a matter of chance. Even less was it the result of the "cunning actions" of the Soviet side, which allegedly succeeded in luring R. Reagan into a trap. When the problem of mutual security is posed commensurate with its far-reaching scale, the sides' fundamental deep-lying interests begin to show through distinctly in their positions.

The attempt to disturb the evolved balance is not only undermining international security but is also fraught with consequences which would inevitably be severely detrimental to the interests of the initiators of this hopeless enterprise themselves. In engendering danger the United States cannot fail to draw it onto itself. Bringing about strategic instability, it runs the risk of suffering from it. The unpredictability of an unchecked arms race would put in a difficult position both those forced to respond to the challenge and the instigators of an acceleration of military competition themselves.

In the race for unattainable military superiority the present U.S. Administration is not, to judge by everything, reckoning with the costs connected with a destabilization of the strategic situation. The impression is being created even that there are forces in Washington hoping to turn instability to their advantage, to the detriment of the other side. Dangerous delusion! Not having achieved decisive superiority, they could only face a strategic chaos equally disastrous for the USSR and the United States and for all mankind.

Nor are the material and other resources even of such a great power as the United States unlimited if they are squandered on far-reaching superarmament programs. The huge chronic budget deficit, the intensification of the contradiction between militarism and the country's socioeconomic needs, the combination of structural and cyclical crises, difficulties in the foreign trade and currency-finance spheres, a weakening of positions in the competitive struggle on world markets--all this and much else cannot fail to impede the ambitious aspirations of aggressive groupings in the U.S. ruling upper stratum.

And, what is most important, militarism is inscribed increasingly less in contemporary world development and does not conform to the growing need for a constructive solution of urgent problems. In building up military strength which is incapable of restoring to it its past might it is merely engendering a threat of general catastrophe. And the more militarism persists in its hopeless aspiration to domination, the more it is counterposing itself to all mankind.

In our time the tune in international development is being called not by a policy of strength but the strength of a policy--one of peace and disarmament. It is consonant with the cherished aspirations of all peoples. The Soviet concept of nuclear disarmament has evoked the broadest response worldwide. It has been supported by many governments, prominent statesmen, political parties and the public.

This concept was further developed in the "Delhi Declaration of Principles of a Nonviolent World Free of Nuclear Weapons" signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi on 27 November 1986. This document of truly historic scale says that peaceful coexistence should be the universal norm of international relations in order that, in our nuclear age, cooperation come to replace confrontation and conflict situations be settled by political and not military means. All-embracing international security should come to replace the "balance of terror".

On behalf of the more than 1 billion persons constituting the population of the two states, the Soviet Union and India appealed to the peoples and leaders of all countries for the adoption of immediate actions which should lead to a world without weapons of mass destruction and without wars. This goal demands specific and immediate actions aimed at disarmament, nuclear primarily. They include the complete destruction of nuclear arsenals before the end of the current century; prevention of the guidance of any weapons into space, which is the common property of mankind; a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests; and a ban on the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

Until nuclear weapons have been eliminated, the USSR and India proposed the immediate conclusion of an international convention banning the use or threat of nuclear weapons. This would be an important specific step en route to complete nuclear disarmament.

The release of mankind from the nuclear threat will, naturally, not come about of its own accord. The objective prerequisites for this alone are not enough. Nor is the mere concept of nuclear disarmament sufficient, however important it is as a true reference point and guide to action. What are needed are actions--purposeful, consistent and incremental.

The old gives way to the new only in struggle, resists stubbornly and attempts to turn back the course of events. But the new in world politics is becoming a powerful force. And this force is on the side of nuclear disarmament, which corresponds to the vital interests of the whole world community. It is the sole intelligent path toward reliable general security, for winning victory is impossible not only in an arms race and nuclear war but also in political dialogue. Victory may be achieved only as a result of negotiations, but only mutual or multilateral, on the basis of honest and just accord. Victory may only be common victory over the common threat of annihilation.

"The SDI was the reason the meeting in Reykjavik failed to justify the hopes which the world community had put in it," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized. "But we have sufficient political will, perseverance and patience to continue to seek

profound, radical accords pertaining to a reduction in and the elimination of nuclear weapons--but only such as ensure mutual stability and equal security."

A new path was opened with the boundaries of accord reached in Reykjavik--forward, toward a radical reduction in nuclear arms. The Soviet Union is unshakable in its resolve to abide by them unswervingly. As soon as Washington recognizes that there is no other intelligent path for the United States also, a historic shift in the struggle for a nuclear-free world could become a reality. This is what the peoples of the whole world want.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

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CSO: 1816/6

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA INTERVIEWS U.S. FIGURES ON CHANCES OF NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

PM301541 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 87 First Edition p 6

'Correspondent G. Vasilev article: "Is a Nuclear-Free World Possible? -- Discussion in U.S. Magazine"]

[Text] New York -- Is a nuclear-free world possible? -- this, the supreme question of our time, is increasingly occupying the minds of thoughtful Americans and arousing keen debates among scientists, politicians, clergymen, and broad public circles. People's alarm over mankind's future, threatened by a Sword of Damocles in the form of weapons of mass destruction, is the catalyst of the discussions.

These broadening debates are reflected in a selection of articles published in the latest issue of THE NEW YORK TIMES Magazine under the headline "A World Without Nuclear Weapons?"

M. Bundy: former national security adviser to the U.S. President, gives an unequivocal answer to this question: "Yes, it is possible." And not only possible, he believes, but also necessary unless mankind wishes to die. The author supports the main provision of the accords reached by the USSR and U.S. leaders in Reykjavik -- the two countries' commitment to strive for a world without nuclear weapons -- and expresses regret that a historic opportunity was missed because of the U.S. side's reluctance to abandon its plans for the deployment of weapons in space.

"Common interest," Bundy states, "demands that we not abandon the long and difficult efforts aimed at achieving constructive arms control agreements... The truth for both sides is that reliable and stabilizing agreements are immeasurably better than unlimited rivalry."

Bundy supports the Soviet proposal on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, although he also considers it more important to secure a radical reduction in strategic offensive armaments and the abandonment of the preparation for "Star Wars," as the Soviet Union so persistently urges too.

The main apologist of the arms race in the magazine is the physicist E. Teller, well known as the "father of the H-bomb." It is unrealistic to believe that talks can guarantee the elimination of nuclear weapons," he peremptorily states.

The arguments used by the "father of the H-bomb" present a picture of a man who conceives of no type of relations among peoples other than those based on the big stick, which in our age is the nuclear missile. There is another striking feature of his arguments: the fundamental dishonesty of this man who bears the title of

scientist. Teller engages in outright deception: He tries to intimidate Americans by referring to the "U.S. lag behind the USSR: and presents an artificial picture of an ABM system allegedly created in the Soviet Union. And the aim of all this is to "sell" Washington's SDI program to the public.

Z. Brzezinski, also a former national security adviser to the U.S. President, puts forward a different line of "defense" against a nuclear-free world. He tries to prove that a world without weapons will be more dangerous than one which is armed. This veteran anti-Sovietist tries to frighten Americans by saying that "the Kremlin may secretly stockpile nuclear weapons" and asserts that Moscow's peace initiatives are aimed solely at "disarming the West." "All this rivalry in sloganeering about a nonnuclear utopia which began so unthinkingly after Reykjavik," he says irately, "may frighten the Western public away from seeking true strategic security." But "true security," according to Brzezinski, consists in better armaments and improved military strategy.

Hatred guides the pens of Teller and Brzezinski. A hatred of socialism so powerful and blinding that they are prepared to sacrifice everything on the altar of anticomunism, even the lives of millions of their fellow citizens, and to destroy all life on our planet.

These articles in this U.S. magazine reflect the complex processes taking place in the public consciousness in the United States, where a confrontation is in progress between the new thinking and the old militarist dogmatism based on "strength," which still paralyzes a considerable proportion of politicians and strategists here.

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CSO: 5200/1469

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S TOLKUNOV SPEAKS AT MANAGUA IPU CONFERENCE

Meets Ortega

PM011325 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meeting with D. Ortega"]

[Text] Managua, 30 Apr -- The visiting USSR Parliamentary Group delegation headed by L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union and chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group, met Wednesday with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega.

At the meeting the head of the Soviet delegation set out the Soviet leadership's foreign policy measures aimed at reducing the level of nuclear tension and eliminating regional conflicts. The entire will of the Soviet people and Government, L.N. Tolkunov stressed, is focused on achieving concrete results in its peace offensive and creating favorable conditions for peaceful creation.

D. Ortega highly assessed Soviet peace initiatives, which accord with present-day requirements. Through its constructive proposals, he noted, the Soviet Union has laid the cornerstone in the creation of a nuclear-free world. The Soviet initiatives are supported worldwide. The peoples expect Washington to show readiness to follow the line of disarmament proposed by the Land of the Soviets.

D. Ortega conveyed very best wishes from the Sandinista Front and the Nicaraguan people and Government to the Soviet people and Government.

The meeting discussed the progress of the 77th IPU conference under way in Managua. The Soviet side stressed that the holding of this important international forum in the Nicaraguan capital attests to the world public's extensive recognition of the Sandinist revolution's growing contribution to the peoples' overall struggle to achieve peace, security, and cooperation.

V.I. Vyalyas, USSR ambassador to Nicaragua, took part in the meeting.

Urge Nuclear-Free World

ID011449 Moscow TASS in English 1106 GMT 1 May 87

[Text] Managua May 1 TASS -- Lev Tolkunov, leader of the Soviet delegation to the 77th conference to the Interparliamentary Union here, has said that the formidable realities of the nuclear age make it imperative for all politicians and statesmen, including

"... to take a fresh look at international relations and adopt a new approach to the management of crises."

Tolkunov, who is chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was addressing a full-scale sitting of the conference Thursday.

"The absurd and immoral situation where mankind's fate turns on the nuclear 'balance of terror' must give way to comprehensive security," he stressed.

"The basis of life in a nuclear-free world must be mutual understanding and trust," he added.

The leader of the Soviet delegation pointed to the need to give up the fatal delusion which was dangerous for all mankind, that a nation could enhance its security by building up arms and developing new weapons systems.

"The problem of security is basically a political rather than a technical problem and can only be resolved by political means," he explained.

Tolkunov also emphasized the need to adopt practical and immediate disarmament measures through agreements for doing away with all nuclear weapons by century's end, bar any arms from outer space as the common property of mankind, outlaw chemical weapons, destroy their stocks, reduce conventional arms and armed forces, and scrap medium-range missiles in Europe in a linkage with shorter-range missiles.

"We are prepared to eliminate also battlefield nuclear weapons," he said.

The Soviet Union, he continued, was consistently pressing along with efforts concerning the whole gamut of issues discussed and in a large measure agreed upon in Reykjavik.

On behalf of the parliamentary group of the USSR, Tolkunov expressed solidarity with the courageous and rightful struggle by the Nicaraguan people to defend their sovereignty, independence and right to self-determination.

"A Central American settlement can and must be achieved by the efforts of Latin American nations on a basis of accords worked out as part of the Contadora process," he said.

"We are witnessing a complicated, crucial and remarkable time when nations are learning the difficult but vital art of living in peace with one another," the leader of the Soviet delegation went on to say.

"Our duty as parliamentarians is to do everything we can to assist the yet unprecedented process of a moral and political recovery of sight by millions of people," he stressed.

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CSO: 5200/1469

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPANISH PAPER INTERVIEWS KARPOV ON ARMS PROPOSALS

PM050818 Madrid YA in Spanish 29 Apr 87 pp 10-11

[Interview with Soviet roving ambassador Viktor Karpov by Enrique Serbeto in Madrid; date not given]

[Excerpt] Madrid -- [Passage omitted] [Serbeto] I would like to start by discussing the proposal that the Soviet Union made in Geneva yesterday for reducing medium-range missiles in Europe.

[Karpov] Actually we have already discussed this proposal, during U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' latest visit to Moscow. All of us who were there -- and I am referring not to myself alone but also to CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the prime minister, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze -- discussed the need to find a solution to the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe as quickly as possible. We proposed a plan to eliminate them under the conditions agreed at the Reykjavik summit. The draft proposal that the United States put forward in March included certain clauses that were inconsistent with what was agreed in Reykjavik, since the United States aimed solely to secure advantages for themselves, not equality for both sides. Following the discussions with Shultz in Moscow the Soviet side proposed a draft agreement to eliminate all medium-range missiles.

[Serbeto] Did you discuss tactical nuclear weapons as well?

[Karpov] Yes, of course we discussed them because we are also willing to reduce tactical nuclear weapons because we believe that these matters must be discussed in these negotiations and not in separate negotiations. If, moreover, we take account of the U.S. Pershing-1B weapon, we know they can be converted into Pershing-2s in just 48 hours. It seems that the United States is only thinking about changing the designation of each kind of weapon. The crucial point in the discussions is whether these accords can open the way to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europe. I recall the NATO "two track" decision of 1979 which mentioned not tactical weapons but Euromissiles, because it was said that the chief threat was the SS-20 missile and that if this threat disappeared so too would the need to deploy these nuclear forces, the U.S. Pershing-2s and cruise missiles. But now the withdrawal of these Soviet missiles is considered insufficient. They are talking about not only nuclear forces but also the need to reduce conventional forces.

Conventional Forces

[Serbeto] We could talk about these conventional forces later, but it must also be remembered that the Soviet Union deployed its SS-20s because of the threat it said the

French and British nuclear forces presented.

Does the fact that it has been agreed to dismantle the SS-20s without any offset mean that this threat no longer exists?

[Karpov] Of course this threat still exists and the French and British nuclear forces will be broached later. Indeed France and Britain possess 1,500-1,600 nuclear warheads. By 1992 they will have approximately 2,000 that will have to be taken into account within the context of Europe's nuclear situation. This is a considerable factor and all these nuclear warheads cannot be said to have no significance in the balance of forces, which is why, by giving our approval for the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe, we are opening the way with a certain degree of risk. We are doing so consistently in order to achieve nuclear disarmament in Europe later on.

[Serbeto] Is your aim with these proposals not, rather, to exploit the lack of agreement that exists between certain European governments in order to eliminate medium-range missiles for fear of their superiority in conventional weapons?

[Karpov] We are only aiming to eliminate nuclear weapons from Europe and if we miss this opportunity perhaps never again in history will another situation like this recur. There is also a risk to our security and we are willing to seriously negotiate the reduction of conventional weapons as well. But those who do not really want the elimination of nuclear weapons are trying to frighten us with this excuse. We too are in favor of such negotiations but unfortunately our partners in the talks have not shown a willingness to revive these negotiations, though for our part we have not abandoned hope of making this an effective forum so that all countries can again discuss these problems and find the road to disarmament. However, this is not all. We have proposed establishing a 300 km wide nuclear-free strip between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and FRG. Gorbachev announced on 10 April that if the West accepts this proposal we are willing to eliminate all our nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles within this strip.

Gorbachev's Change

[Serbeto] Be that as it may, the Soviet disarmament stance has changed greatly since 1985, as shown by its constant offers of a moratorium on nuclear testing or Euromissiles reduction. Is this due solely to Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power?

[Karpov] Undoubtedly. He has provided a new and much more progressive viewpoint on these problems, though an influence was also exerted by the party's own conclusions and the viewpoint of broad social sectors, reflecting a new approach to this issue.

[Serbeto] But even supposing that this agreement to reduce missiles deployed in Europe is reached, there is still the huge arsenal of ICBM weapons and the ABM Treaty.

[Karpov] During Shultz' visit to Moscow we proposed maintaining moderation in connection with intercontinental strategic weapons so that from a date to be decided by the two countries neither would increase its arsenal, but we are still waiting for Washington's reply. In Reykjavik we also said that we considered it possible to reduce arsenals by half in 5 years, but on condition that the ABM Treaty would not be abandoned in 10 years' time. Now in Moscow Mr Shultz has said that it will take 7 years to reduce strategic missiles by 50 percent. As for the ABM Treaty, we believe that the United States is exceeding its limits by constructing two radar installations, one in Greenland and the other in Britain. They criticize us for constructing another radar installation at Krasnoyarsk but we cannot accept this comparison because the

radar installation is being constructed to observe space, which does not conflict with this treaty.

But we are tired of discussing this topic and are prepared to destroy our radar installation if the United States does the same with those that it is constructing in Greenland and Britain, but they do not agree to it.

Development of SDI

[Serbeto] In this connection it seems that the only thing that interests you is to oppose the United States' SDI and prevent its development.

[Karpov] As we have already said on other occasions, we are not worried by SDI because we have much less costly equipment to neutralize it militarily, but it seems to us outright madness because it will subject the world to another and greater threat. In Reykjavik we talked about not exceeding the ABM Treaty for a 10 year period and meanwhile continuing research in ground-base laboratories. However, now Mr Shultz comes to Moscow and says "no," that they are only willing to do this for 7 years and suggests to us the signing of an agreement that would permit the United States to deploy its space weapons in 1994; and of course we are not willing to accept this.

[Serbeto] The two superpowers have been negotiating for 40 years without really achieving a reduction of nuclear weapons. What is your overall assessment of this process?

[Karpov] Unfortunately the results of all these years are very meager. However, I could cite some positive achievements in this process, such as the 1963 agreement banning nuclear explosions above ground, in the sea, and in the atmosphere. Also, the 1967 agreement banning placing nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth. Also, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which Spain is to sign soon, as you have announced. One must also add the ABM Treaty limiting antimissile weapons, the SALT I agreement of 1972 and SALT II of 1979 and the confidence-building measures agreed at the CSCE conference in Stockholm.

[Serbeto] What is your opinion about the future?

[Karpov] The outlook will be determined largely during the current talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on eliminating the Euromissiles and also the negotiations within the context of the disarmament conference for eliminating chemical weapons and their stockpiles. It is in these two directions that there are the best chances of reaching an agreement. It is necessary just to work for an acceptable solution that guarantees security on both sides.

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CSO: 5200/1468

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S. CONCERNS ON EUROPEAN MILITARY BALANCE REBUTTED

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 7, Apr 87 pp 2-5

[Article by Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov, USSR Armed Forces General Staff department head: "U.S. Is Erecting Obstacles to the Solution of the Euromissile Problem"]

[Text] The Soviet initiative on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe has created the basis for a breakthrough on disarmament issues. Nothing now stands in the way of an agreement that could benefit the whole of Europe: the idea is to scrap more than 700 units of the most destabilising arms--medium-range missiles (USSR -- 355, the U.S. - 380) and more than 1,200 warheads on them.

This proposal is difficult to oppose openly. But one thing is worrying: official spokesmen of the USA and several NATO countries have lately been emphasising some "hidden dangers" contained in the Soviet proposal on Euro-missiles.

"Paradoxically, however," Mikhail Gorbachev noted on 10 April, "some politicians and even governments are dropping the zero option they proposed earlier like a hot potato and are trying to condition an accord on medium-range missiles on all kinds of reservations and linkages."

The U.S. approach to the problem of medium-range missiles is not sincere. This approach contains complicating elements that must be removed if the American side is really interested in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. What are these elements? The U.S. is trying to ensure that:

- a) Pershing-2 medium-range missiles be not phased out, but converted into shorter-range missiles, that is, that some missiles be replaced by others. This is tantamount to a new round of missile deployment in Europe.
- b) Cruise missiles be shifted from ground to warships or converted into non-nuclear ones.
- c) Existing medium-range missile bases be preserved, that is, the requisite infrastructure be left intact to ensure deployment of new medium-range missiles at any time.

d) The problem of medium-range missiles be resolved in linkage with shorter-range tactical missiles.

e) Verification issues be brought to the point of absurdity, excluding adequate control on U.S. territory.

Some officials in the USA and NATO countries claim that Soviet strategic nuclear systems, medium-range aircraft and shorter-range tactical missiles pose a threat. Western Europe cannot counterweight. These claims hold no water. A similar and even greater threat exists for the Soviet Union and it is posed by the U.S. and NATO. In strategic offensive armaments there is a parity between the USSR and the USA. In Reykjavik Mikhail Gorbachev handed over to Ronald Reagan a table of comparative data on the strategic armaments as of 11 October, 1986, with which the American side agreed. The table shows that the USSR has slightly more delivery vehicles (USSR - 2,480, U.S. - 2,208), but on the other hand the U.S. has more warheads on them (USSR - 10,000, U.S.-14,800).

So what Soviet threat can there be in the light of these data? The situation regarding medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe is as follows. The U.S. and NATO have 588 missiles (108 Pershing-2's, 272 cruise missiles, 64 British missiles and 114 French missiles). The USSR has 355 missiles (243 SS-20's and 112 SS-4's). NATO countries have more missiles and warheads than the USSR. In medium-range aircraft the advantage is clearly with NATO. Equipped with a larger number of nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads than the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, NATO speaks of a "Soviet threat."

Besides, the Soviet leadership has declared that following the signing of an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will withdraw from the CDR and Czechoslovakia longer-range tactical missiles sited there in reply to the deployment of Pershing 2's and cruise missiles.

For an early conclusion of an agreement, we have proposed that discussions begin on the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km, stationed on the European continent, without linking with them the course and outcome of the problem of medium-range missiles.

The West, however, seems to be deciding that it has too few reservations and linkages. Accordingly, it is contemplating to make the solution of the medium-range missile problem conditional on preliminary settlement of the question of conventional armaments. It wants to create a vicious circle that no one will be able to break.

For ten months the U.S. and NATO have not come up with an answer to the Budapest appeal to reduce conventional weapons in Europe. It is said simultaneously that the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's superiority in conventional forces precludes the renunciation of nuclear weapons. How is this so-called superiority constructed? The technique is simple: the armed forces of France and Spain are not counted; reserve formations and stored stockpiles of

armaments and equipment on the Western side are not taken into account either; the amount of armaments in the Warsaw Treaty countries is artificially over-rated, and that in NATO underrated.

Actually, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO have approximately equal numbers of personnel and artillery pieces. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation has some advantage over NATO in armour. But NATO has an edge in the number of combat ready divisions, anti-tank systems, and fighter-bombers. On the whole, there is approximate parity in conventional arms.

To look at the problem through the Soviet eyes, it will emerge that the USSR, as distinct from the U.S., is under a double blow--by strategic systems and forward-based means of the U.S. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are ringed by a network of 1,600 American military bases and installations. We do not have any equivalent to the U.S. in terms of military bases and installations. Besides, there exist nuclear systems of Britain and France (some 600 warheads, to be doubled by 1995). The USSR does not count them in the balance of forces with the American, although these missiles are aimed at targets on Soviet territory. Such is the real picture. The conclusion that suggests itself is clear: the U.S. and its allies are deliberately complicating talks on medium-range missiles, on Euro-weapons in general.

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CSO. 5200/1468

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COMMENTATOR VIEWS NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE

PMJ01537 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Apr 87 First Edition p 1

[Vladimir Katin article under the rubric "Our Dialogue": "Europe Should Be Peaceful"]

[Text] these days all our business at work, all our meetings, conversations, and all the calls and letters to the editor keep coming back to the same chief topic. Never before has world interest been so great in the Soviet-U.S. Geneva talks as in the last week of April. After a recess, they have resumed in a new atmosphere. The Soviet delegation and the U.S. representatives have begun drawing up specific accords on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles.

The proposals made quite recently during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia and the subsequent discussion of the entire complex of nuclear disarmament problems at the talks with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in Moscow have opened up the way to an agreement, provided that our partners really want this.

It is often said that Europe is our common home. True, it has served us for many thousands of years, it is comfortable to live in, and appears to be secure and everlasting. But in reality it is incredibly fragile, because hundreds of megatons of nuclear explosives are now stored in it and so the majority of European countries would cease to exist after an explosion on their territory of even 10 powerful nuclear warheads. Consequently the interest and concern shown by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers regarding what is being done -- or not being done -- to ensure European security is understandable.

Engineer V. Khitov from Kuybyshev wrote to the editor: "Western radio stations are broadcasting a great deal lately on the subject of how it is essential to keep a policy of strength when dealing with the Soviet Union on the question of medium-range missiles and other issues so that the Russians will be more complaisant. How should this be interpreted? After all, a position of strength on one side presupposes a position of weakness on the other -- ours...."

The question is germane. Indeed, since the U.S. secretary of state's visit to Moscow, the American and West European mass media have been loudly discussing the means and levers with which pressure should be brought to bear on the Soviet Union. It has been suggested that an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles be linked with the possibility of a NATO "arms upgrading" in short-range missiles. The NATO staff is trying to think of how to keep "Pershing-2" in a version truncated by one stage (that is, with reduced range) and how to transfer cruise missiles to ships. There are even influential political figures to be found in Western Europe and the United States who

frankly say that a nuclear-free Europe is unacceptable to the West and that it would be better to lose face by going back on one's word and retracting one's own proposals than to allow nuclear missiles to be removed from Europe.

Brent Scowcroft, for example, who was national security assistant to the President in the mid-seventies, wrote recently in THE WASHINGTON POST: "The administration made a fundamental error when it proposed its zero option in 1981; this decision should not be used now to justify the withdrawal of the missiles."

All this puts us on our guard. After all, the new Soviet proposal on missiles in Europe creates the best conditions for making a breakthrough in the chronically difficult question of nuclear arms reduction.

It seems that NATO is putting together a package of conditions which, even if it does not prevent us reaching an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe, could cause the talks to drag on for a long time. It is, as our reader rightly says, a policy of pressure. This method in relation to the USSR is not new. The whole question is of how effective this method really is and whether it has ever produced the desired results.

I was recently asked during a lecture: Say what you like, but it was the Soviet Union nevertheless that selected the question of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, so does this not mean that they can squeeze us dry and get concessions out of us?

This is not how matters stand. The Soviet Union's proposal on medium-range missiles in Europe is a specific manifestation of creative, flexible political thinking. The initiative was certainly not made as a result of outside pressure. During the months since Reykjavik the USSR has painstakingly weighed up, studied, and analyzed the situation that has taken shape since the summit and has sensitively tuned into the moods of the European and world public. While being concerned for our own security, we do not divorce it from the security of other states. It is in this that one should seek the reason for the change in the Soviet position on medium-range missiles.

This is how it happened. When every means had been tried and when it had become clear that the United States was not prepared to resolve all the issues in the package as a whole, we acknowledged that it would be expedient to first reach an agreement on medium-range missiles. This shows flexibility in our policy and courage in our choice of a reasonable compromise. At the same time, the Soviet Union has not departed from its principled position in the question of eliminating nuclear arms or with regard to the rest of the package and the whole nuclear arms complex. M.S. Gorbachev specially emphasizes that the Soviet Government still considers it highly important to reach an agreement on substantially limiting and ultimately eliminating strategic arms. The conclusion of such an agreement must be made conditional on the decision to prevent the placement of arms in space, in view of the organic interdependence of these issues.

In my conversations with foreign journalists, I quite often hear the following argument in favor of keeping U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe: If they are removed the Warsaw Pact countries will gain a considerable advantage in conventional weapons. Is this so?

In the arguments of those who are opposed to the elimination of the missiles, I personally am mainly struck by the abundance of figures and every possible calculation and computation from which no balanced equation is ever made but a strong bias invariably drawn, showing the Warsaw Pact's alleged military superiority. All this

seems to reveal an evil intent and a desire to cover the path travelled by Soviet-NATO talks with thorns. But there are other highly authoritative opinions from Western sources. For example, according to information provided by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, there is an overall balance of forces in conventional weapons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At the same time the Brookings Institution (United States) believes that the ratio of the two alliances' conventional forces is now even somewhat in the West's favor.

Moreover, it will soon be 1 year since NATO began studying in depth what would seem to be very easy to understand -- the collective ideas put forward by the Warsaw Pact states to reduce conventional arms and armed forces by 1 million personnel on each side. Unfortunately, no progress has yet been made. There is worse to come. NATO has evidently actually "forgotten" this proposal, because its leaders have suddenly begun making strong references to the Warsaw Pact's large preponderance both in terms of the number of divisions and in conventional arms.

There can be no argument that any new initiative must be discussed. The impression is forming, however, that many politicians in the West have no burning desire to become really actively involved in the process of freeing Europe of its nuclear explosives and that they are procrastinating in every way possible by inventing arguments off-hand to preserve them.

This discussion requires elementary honesty of our foreign opponents. After all, Western Europe has U.S. forward-based weapons they prefer for some reason to keep quiet about. The United States has sited more than 1,000 military installations in Western Europe, including 271 large military bases. The Geneva talks on eliminating medium-range missiles at some of these bases do not touch either the bombers or the nuclear munitions at U.S. military airfields and depots in the FRG, Britain, and other countries. But can our country really ignore this terrible danger? The Soviet Government vigilantly maintains its defense at a level at which it will always be able to parry this danger.

The editorial mail includes a letter from F. Morozov from Nalchik, who asks: "Why do British and French nuclear arms not come into discussions on eliminating medium-range missiles?" The author of another letter, Yu. Bondarenko, from Chita asks the same question: "So, we intend to destroy all of our missiles in the European part of the country which we keep there to be able to answer a first strike, while Britain and France, I hear, will continue to build up their own nuclear arsenal. Is the Soviet Union not laying itself open?"

Yes, these countries' 162 missiles are no plaything -- they are equipped with approximately 400 warheads and, what is more, work to modernize these nuclear missiles is in full swing. Two factors played a part, in my opinion, when the decision was taken not to take these missiles into account. First -- in an attempt to move the problem of nuclear disarmament in Europe from its chronic standstill, it was decided to make a major concession, even at the cost of taking a certain risk. Second -- the joint experience of developing the pan-European process nevertheless gives us grounds to trust....

These two mutually balanced factors, it seems to me, decided the matter. The degree of risk in making the concession not to count the British-French nuclear potential is compensated or, one could say, balanced out by our substantial trust in our partners from the anti-Hitler coalition -- a trust being made stronger by cooperation in the sphere of European detente. At the same time, when building its defense and its

security system, our country will not discount the fact that London and Paris have their own nuclear arms. This is both logical and correct.

During the recent visit by W. Jaruzelski to Moscow, M.S. Gorbachev spoke of the need to observe the complex balance of interests, including the principle of parity in all arms parameters and at all stages in arms reduction. Achieving an agreement on this basis is a difficult process requiring great effort and political will. Our country has never been found wanting in either effort or will and it is again ready to go its part of the way. In my opinion, the world public is beginning to understand the need for the West to take some steps to meet us.

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CSO: 5200/1468

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW 'TOP PRIORITY' 1 MAY REVIEWS INF PROPOSAL

LD021249 Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 1 May 87

[*"Top Priority"* program presented by Vladimir Pozner, with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] [Pozner] Obviously top priority today is the issue of the INF missiles in Europe, and that is to say the draft proposal that has been tabled now by the Soviet Union, what are your feelings about that?

[Bogdanov] My feeling about that is the same that you have, but I, I'm afraid that there is another issue at that top priority, you have come back to the *"Top Priority,"* we were missing you very much Vladimir, and I believe that our listeners at the American end also were missing you, maybe you will tell us some words why you were absent, why, what happened to you?

[Pozner] Well I don't want, I don't want to waste too much time on this valuable program to talk about that. However, I was in the United States for about 3 weeks on a very interesting visit.

[Bogdanov] That's a very good excuse, that's the only excuse.

[Pozner] Yes, that's why I was not with you.

[Plekhanov] I hope you listened to *"Top Priority"*?

[Pozner] Of course, of course, although I must say that you don't find short wave radio sets in every home or in any hotel, you have to make an effort. But let's get back to this issue of the INF and the Soviet proposals.

[Bogdanov] Now I have a clean conscience to come back to the major issue of our program, which is INF. But let me, you know, we have been talking about that quite a number of times and I, I believe that our listeners are aware of the details of all that. I would like to have another look, at what INF means as a step in the direction of dealing with the arms control. It seems if you hear some voices from Europe, from America, from some other places, you hear some voices saying look, what's this all about, what's importance of that, it has no military importance, it has no importance at all, it's a very minor thing, why you are so much excited about that? And I believe it's a high time to summarize, you know, and to give an answer to that. I believe it's a great great event in, if it happens of course, in our life. Why? Because for the

first time, after 40 years of the arms race between USSR and United States existing arms system, weapons system, existed, not only existing but already deployed, can be, can be eliminated. You know, that's the real issue, that's the real, you know event, number one.

Number two, you make a first step toward the nonnuclear whatever you call dream, or fiction or whatever it is, but it's a real step, you eliminate the whole class of nuclear weapons.

And the third point of mine is that the very, you know efficient proof that a deal, when you are in the spirit of compromise, when you are in the spirit of a goodwill, a deal is possible even between such an administration as this honorable republican administration, and between the evil, evil empire, that's my point you know.

[Pozner] Oh I think that's a very important point. Basically what you're saying is then that if we do get an agreement on INF it will be the first time not only in the history of Soviet-American relations, but I think it may be the first time ever that weapons have actually been cut back on. And if you look back on history I don't think you can find any time when it happened. I may be wrong, but certainly not in Soviet-American relations when a class of weapons was simply destroyed.

We will talk more about that perhaps, and I don't want you to lose your energy Dr Bogdanov, but I'd like to ask Dr Plekhanov one question, and that is in the Soviet draft that had been tabled is there anything our listeners should know that they don't know about today? Are there any, perhaps you might sum it up, the points that they should be aware of. Just what are the Soviets proposing? The reason I say this is because, having just come back from the United States, I found that the majority of the people I met with, and these were not factory workers, mind you, were not at all aware of Soviet intentions. So perhaps you might sum it up?

[Bogdanov] You mean well informed public opinion.

[Pozner] That's what I said, yes indeed.

[Plekhanov] Well, the main thrust of the INF agreement, as proposed by the Soviet Union, is to eliminate all existing medium-range missiles from Europe.

[Pozner] Meaning American and...?

[Plehamov] American and Soviet missiles from Europe, and that refers to missiles with a range of 600 miles or more.

[Pozner] When you say eliminate would that mean destroyed? Be destroyed totally?

[Plekhanov] Be destroyed, be destroyed totally.

[Pozner] Does that also mean that this destruction is being supervised?

[Plekhanov] Yes, of course. Under strict verification.

[Bogdanov] That's the main point, yes.

[Plekhanov] Yes. Yes, well, I don't know what our readers are aware of that. [sentence as heard]

[Pozner] Well, please...

[Plekhanov interrupts] Verification is extremely important. We are for an agreement which would effectively eliminate those missiles, that no loopholes would be left and no chance for cheating that would exist for either side. So we are for very intrusive, I would say, verification procedures, including on-site inspections, including inspections at the places where those weapons were produced and....

[Pozner interrupts] And where they will be destroyed.

[Plekhanov] And where they will be destroyed, yes. Destruction itself will be under international supervision. Then another very important point refers to the missiles with ranges from 300 to 600 miles. They are called the shorter range intermediate missiles, intermediate forces, and those are to be eliminated too, within the year from the moment that we eliminate the INF. So that class of missiles will also be destroyed. What will be left from the INF are 100 warheads for the United States and the Soviet Union in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, so Europe will be free of that class of missiles, and they will be just a smaller reminder, a remainder.

[Pozner] You're saying 100 warheads for the Soviets in the Asian part of the Soviet Union?

[Plekhanov] In the Asian part, and a similar amount, the same amount for the United States.

[Pozner] In some other region?

[Plekhanov] In some other region, of course, not, not [word indistinct]

[Bogdanov] So why is it they are not reaching the territory on the other side? And, I am sorry, just very short comment. You know I wonder will the American negotiators in Geneva give their consent to our very tricky proposal on verification. Why is it tricky? Because this suggests that we have a right, we, I mean -- American side and the Soviet side, to have a permanent inspections on the American side and the Soviet side, to have a permanent inspections on the factories which may be under suspicion as producing missiles of medium-range.

[Pozner] That is our proposal.

[Bogdanov] That is our proposal, and which meets American, which meets...

[Plekhanov interrupts] Very strict verification requirements.

[Bogdanov] Verification requirements of the American side. Now we have, as our American listeners are aware, state-run factories, and they have private-run factories. I wonder how they will force their private-run factories to allow Soviet inspectors to be all the time present at their factories? That's my question. I don't ask you for the answers.

[Pozner] That obviously is one of the complex issues. Now there's another complex issue which I hope perhaps you will help elucidate, and that is as follows. If you look at what is happening today as we move forward toward an INF agreement, you see that in the United States some people who were previously for agreement, some might be qualified as liberals, others not as liberals but people who have been for agreements.

For instance, Dr Kissinger who is definitely not a liberal but has been for agreements, now seems to be very much against them, whereas certain hardliners now seem to be moving towards agreement. What is happening? What is this disarray, this mixture of, I don't know, different views suddenly changing? Can anyone tell me what's happening, what's the...?

[Plekhanov] Well, I think that there are several developments which do look strange in American politics in the past year or two. Things are changing both in the United States and in Soviet-American relations and at a time of great shifts there are people who lose their bearings, so to say.

[Pozner] You're talking about crossroads, like kind of?

[Plekhanov] Yes, crossroads, people changing their minds, and some people being at a loss, losing orientation. As far as Dr Kissinger is concerned, I think that he's simply jealous. He is used to the role -- he is used to the role of the architect of foreign policy, and right now he sees that the administration, the U.S. Administration, is finding its way around an agreement with the Soviet Union which clearly would be billed as a major agreement without the participation of Dr Kissinger. And I think in that situation he is simply trying to, well to minimize the importance of something if it is without him.

[Pozner] Are you saying that Dr Kissinger is an egoist?

[Plekhanov] Well, that would be an overstatement to say that. But, but I think that the personal feelings are to be taken into account. I note with interest that in a recent speech to the trilateral commission meeting in California, Dr Kissinger made the same arguments against an INF agreement and he was not supported by the audience there, and that was an audience representing a broad spectrum of elite views in the United States and Western Europe and Japan on the foreign policy issue.

[Bogdanov] And you know, I always was in difficulty in defining what American liberal means, you know. They have such a funny mixture of conservative liberal or whatever it is that you never, you are never able to define exact of precise -- to give a precise definition who is Mr Kissinger, how much he is conservative, how much he is liberal. [sentence as heard] One day we should put this question.

[Pozner] In this case, you are using the term Mr Kissinger generically, I suppose?

[Bogdanov] Yes, yes, yes.

[Pozner] Right. Getting back to what you said at the beginning of this show, Dr Bogdanov, about some people saying that in the final analysis the INF treaty is not all that important and that from the military standpoint this is a minor issue. Before I continue, and I will continue, I'd like to ask both of you, would you basically in a cold analysis, agree that INF in the military sense is not all that important?

[Bogdanov] My analysis, and I dare to say that I have been spending quite a deal of time on military problems, my analysis is it has a lot of military [word indistinct].

[Pozner] You do believe so?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I do believe.

[Pozner] How about you?

[Plekhanov] So do I and I can try to prove it. I think that those missiles are especially dangerous because they are within a very close range of each other.

[Pozner] Meaning?

[Plekhanov] I mean the INF systems. They are very powerful nuclear-tipped missiles which are suitable for lightning strikes and which are computer-operated, and as such, you know, they put the world closer, they move the world closer to a hair-trigger kind of a situation. And so I think withdrawing them from the firing range of each other, destroying them completely, would mean the lowering of, of the danger, the level of danger of an unwanted nuclear war in Europe.

[Pozner] Well then, let me put it slightly different. If I were to say we have scales here, and on one scale we put the military importance of achieving the INF agreement, and on the other scale we put the climate, the atmosphere that would be created by such an agreement being reached, which scale would weigh heavier?

[Bogdanov] Both.

[Pozner] Both would weigh heavier?

[Bogdanov] Yeah.

[Plekhanov] I don't think you put, you should put them on different sides of the scale. I think you should put them on the same side, because they would be, would mean progress in the same direction.

[Pozner] Well I'm going to keep on plugging away. I will still ask you, do you not think that if such an agreement is arrived at and signed, and if we begin to destroy the INF, would that not create a completely new political climate that would be enormously important in leading to other agreements?

[Bogdanov] Vladimir, that goes without saying. I am in full agreement with you. That's the most important point you have mentioned just now in the whole business we are talking about.

[Pozner] I see.

[Plekhanov] Well, of course, this could be the start down a long road toward complete nuclear disarmament, and not only nuclear disarmament but disarmament in the conventional area as well. It could be the opening salvo in the whole fusillade of, you know, if one can use that word in this context, against the danger of war.

[Pozner] Yes?

[Bogdanov] Only very short comment. You know, we have been talking a lot about trust. If we start eliminating missiles under strict control and after 2, 3 years people will say look, they are honest, I mean both sides.

[Pozner] Both sides.

[Bogdanov] They are honestly, you know.

[Pozner] Doing what they said they'd do.

[Bogdanov] Doing what they say. You know what tremendous impact it will have for the (?other) arms control, you know for the changing of the whole climate of trust between two sides.

[Plekhanov] Now that is very important and such practices which we are suggesting now as the exchange of inspectors and so on, which would put the military on both sides into closer contact with each other, would also serve to increase the level of trust. After all, we must face this fact that there is no way we can fight a war against each other without destroying ourselves.

[Pozner] Good enough. Time is running out on us. I have one last question. What with all the disarray that we see in the West about this issue and the once liberals becoming very conservative or whatever it is, there are other vistas which can lead to agreement, which can lead to better understanding. I believe one of them are space bridges, which is a completely different area, but I do know that both of you were present recently when there was a contact, a space bridge between representatives of the United States Congress and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. What was your impression?

[Bogdanov] My impression is that that kind of bridge could become possible only in the present environment of really both sides trying to deliver something.

[Pozner] Were you impressed by what you saw at all? Do you think it worked?

[Plekhanov] Oh yes, oh yes. Yes, I thought of a biblical saying: There is a time to throw stones and there is a time to gather stones. Now the stone-gathering atmosphere was so impressive during that bridge.

[Pozner] Was it really?

[Plekhanov] Yes, yes. The two sides were not in the mood for making points against each other. They were interested in having a productive dialogue and sharing their experiences and finding their common ground and something common that they could do together to improve Soviet-American relations. And I think that we missed there [as heard] was you because you were one of the pioneer bridge builders in that area.

[Pozner] That's all right. I think there should be more pioneers around. I believe there will be a follow-up on this, will there not?

[Bogdanov] Yes. Now, I believe it will be followed.

[Pozner] Well, very good, I want to thank you for being with us today, thank our listeners for also being with us and say good-bye until a week from today at the same time when you will hear another edition of "Top Priority." This is Vladimir Pozner.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: REAGAN APRIL-MAY COMMENTS ON INF TALKS VIEWED

'U.S. Ready To Negotiate'

PM011229 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS dispatch: "Reagan Interview"]

[Text] Washington, 29 Apr -- U.S. President R. Reagan granted an interview to a group of U.S. journalists on Tuesday in the course of which he was asked a number of questions concerning the administration's position in respect to its main objectives in the talks with the Soviet Union on the achievement of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. The President's attention was in particular drawn to a recent statement by Secretary of State G. Shultz on his return from Moscow to the effect that "We should take the Russians at face value when they say they are talking seriously about arms control because they want a less threatening and less nuclear world."

R. Reagan assured the journalists that the United States was ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union although, as he said, "this does not mean that you don't insist on verification [proverka] and the safeguards we (that is the United States -- TASS) must have in such an agreement or treaty."

Replying to a question about differences within the administration on the question of a medium-range missile agreement he said: "I encourage different opinions because I have to make decisions. I make them on the basis of everything I hear from those who counsel me. But when I make a final decision they must implement it regardless of whether they consider it correct or not."

'Important Outstanding Issues'

LD011347 Moscow TASS in English 1321 GMT 1 May 87

[Text] Washington May 1 TASS -- The exchanges that U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz had in Moscow "increase prospects for an interim agreement on intermediate nuclear forces," President Reagan said Thursday.

In the President's written responses to questions submitted by the newspaper "ASAHI SHIMBUN" and released by the White House Reagan noted, however, that there remained in that area "important outstanding issues to be resolved, particularly on shorter-range intermediate nuclear force and verification."

The head of the Washington administration said the United States was "consulting intensively" with its allies in Europe and Asia, including Japan, on these issues.

In an interview with the Japanese newspaper he reiterated the current U.S. Administration's commitment to the "Star Wars" programs.

Puts 'New Obstacles' in Way

LD042025 Moscow TASS in English 2009 GMT 4 May 87

[Text] Washington May 4 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports.

A statement by President Reagan on arms control talks published by the White House today advances the proposals that place new obstacles in the way toward reaching agreements on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and on strategic arms reduction. The statement says that President Reagan has directed the U.S. negotiator at the talks on strategic arms to intensify efforts to reach agreement on reducing strategic nuclear arms and that the United States will shortly table a draft treaty text. The draft will stipulate that both the United States and the Soviet Union would commit themselves not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty only through 1994.

The statement proposes to begin the implementation of strategic offensive arms reductions by cutting them by 50 percent over seven years from entry into force of a strategic arms reduction agreement. And regardless of when such an agreement is concluded it is envisaged that the work to create and the plans to deploy "Strategic Defence Initiative" systems will remain intact even after 1994. The statement says that either side "could deploy defensive systems of its choosing unless mutually agreed otherwise." Thus, it is actually envisaged that while the talks on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, which are needed for neutralising SDI, will be under way, the United States will be busy preparing the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems with space-basing elements.

As to the question of reaching agreement on the elimination of medium-range weapon systems in Europe, the questions of verification and control are raised again, even though the Soviet Union has already advanced detailed proposals in this area, to which the statement does not give any concrete answer. The statement also categorically rejects the need to eliminate shorter-range missiles with which other countries, besides the USSR and the USA, are armed. (This refers to U.S. Pershing-1 missiles deployed in the FRG territory, which were formally adopted for service by the Bundeswehr, but which are controlled by the USA. -- TASS correspondent)

The statement also contains attacks on the United States Congress for the striving of many of its members to cut the military appropriations demanded by the administration for the 1988 fiscal year, above all for the SDI. The statement says that the President will veto any bill which cuts the appropriations.

Proposals 'Complicate' Talks

LD050928 Moscow TASS in English 0910 GMT 5 May 87

[Text] Washington May 5 TASS -- The White House has issued a written statement by U.S. President Ronald Reagan in connection with the 8th round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms opening in Geneva.

The statement made proposals that complicate even further the Soviet-U.S. talks for achieving agreements on both strategic arms and medium-range missiles in Europe.

The statement said that Reagan had directed the leader of the U.S. delegation to the talks on strategic arms "to intensify efforts to reach agreement on reducing" such arms by 50 percent and that the United States would shortly table a draft agreement toward that end.

The draft, the statement asserted, would reflect "the basic agreements on strategic arms reductions" reached during the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik.

"We (the Soviet Union and the United States) have made great progress in START (Strategic Arms Reductions Talks)," the statement said further.

The President proposed that the two countries commit not to withdraw from the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems through 1994, rather than for ten years as suggested by the Soviet Union.

He proposed at the same time that 50 percent cuts be made in strategic offensive arms over seven years from the entry into force of a START agreement.

The President added that regardless of the signing date of such an agreement, after 1994 "either side (the Soviet Union or the United States) could deploy defensive systems of its choosing, unless mutually agreed otherwise."

This effectively means that while talks will be under way on strategic offensive arms reductions, the United States will press along with full-scale preparations for deploying anti-ballistic missile systems with space-based elements as early as 1994, which will rule out a START agreement completely.

The assertion in the presidential statement that the U.S. negotiators had been instructed to "intensify" the talks just does not square with this circumstance.

As to the issue of reaching an agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles in Europe, the statement said that "there have been some new developments in these talks," that the Soviet draft treaty "appears to reflect the agreements" made in Reykjavik and that the U.S. side was "studying carefully" the Soviet draft.

But the President's statement then immediately raised verification issues again, although the Soviet Union had already detailed proposals on that score.

The statement did not give a concrete response to those proposals, while stressing that, in the U.S. opinion, they did not meet requirements for the inspection of sites suspected of violations of an INF agreement.

The statement attacked U.S. Congress for the desire by many law-makers "to attach" to the defense authorization bill for fiscal 1988 amendments on arms control, which would allegedly "undermine our most vital defense programs -- such as our Strategic Defense Initiative."

The amendments meant are proposals made by a significant number of congressmen to slash the administration's request for military spending, including funding for SDI, somewhat, bind the United States to return to within the limits of the SALT-2 treaty and

stay there, and ban appropriations for nuclear testing involving yields of over one kiloton.

The statement said the President would veto any bill with those amendments.

The statement by the White House chief drew criticisms from the American press. After recalling that the White House was being "optimistic" about a possibility of concluding an INF agreement and holding a summit, THE WASHINGTON POST said the President's statement had given rise to doubts about the success.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ENVOYS CONTINUE BRIEFING WESTERN OFFICIALS

Karpov Leaves for Athens

LD291736 Madrid in Spanish to Europe 1300 GMT 27 Apr 87

[Text] Viktor Karpov, director general for disarmament [title as heard] at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, left Spain for Athens this morning. Karpov paid a 2-day visit to the Spanish capital to inform our country's authorities of the Soviet proposals on the reduction of armaments between the two super-powers.

Bessmertnykh in Canada

LD32059 Montreal International Service in English 2000 GMT 3 May 87

[Text] The Soviet press attache in Ottawa says Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev did not ask Canada to act as a mediator in nuclear disarmament talks. Igor Lobanov denied the report published yesterday in a Canadian newspaper stating that Soviet envoy Aleksandr Bessmertnykh had asked Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to help eliminate nuclear missiles in Europe. He says the envoy met with the prime minister and informed him of the Soviet position on arms control negotiations. However, Mr Lobanov, who attended the meeting, says it was not an appeal but rather an exchange of information.

Rodionov Visits Netherlands

LD041403 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 4 May 87

[Text] The Hague May 4 TASS -- Today Nikolay Rodionov, a special envoy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with Hans Van Den Broek, minister of foreign affairs of the Netherlands, and with senior officials of the Dutch Foreign Ministry.

He informed them of the results of the talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow.

The information was regarded with much attention.

The Dutch side set out its evaluation of the talks, emphasizing an interest in achieving an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe as soon as possible.

Nikolay Rodionov also had meetings in the Standing Foreign Affairs Commission of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, as well as with representatives of the Labour Party leadership.

Suslov Visits Austria

LB060947 Moscow TASS in English 0834 GMT 6 May 87

[Text] Vienna May 6 TASS -- Franz Vranitzky, federal chancellor of the republic of Austria, received Tuesday Soviet Envoy Vladimir Suslov, an ambassador at large, and Gennadiy Shikin, ambassador of the USSR to Austria.

During the talk the chancellor was informed about the new Soviet proposals at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FURTHER REPORTS ON WEST EUROPEAN RESPONSE

FRG: SPD's Vogel in Favor

LB191825 Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT 19 Apr 87

[Text] Bonn, 19 Apr (TASS)--The chairman of the Bundestag faction of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Hans-Jochen Vogel, said today it was in the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany to use the chance offered by the latest proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, for discussing the issue of reducing and ultimately eliminating missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometers in Europe.

He demanded that West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl see to it that the government clarify its position on nuclear disarmament.

Turkish Foreign Minister

PM300823 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Stepanov dispatch: "Turkey's Position"]

[Text] Ankara, 23 Apr -- Evaluating the recent Soviet peace proposals and the state of Turkish-Soviet relations in an interview in the Turkish newspaper DAILY NEWS, Turkish Foreign Minister V. Halefoglu declared: "We welcome the positive steps in the arms control sphere. They are more promising than ever before. A real opportunity to eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe has emerged as a result of the Soviet-U.S. high-level dialogue. At the same time, we believe that the implementation of the 'zero option' in Europe must be complemented by the reduction of the balance of tactical nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to the most flexible level possible. In our view, attention must be devoted to ensuring that the remaining medium-range missiles in Asia cannot threaten any NATO country.

"Turkey has always advocated detente and economic cooperation with East European countries on the basis of mutual respect, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

"Our relations with the Soviet Union have recently been developing in a favorable direction. This is evidenced, in particular, by the long-term agreements on supplies of a large quantity of Soviet natural gas to Turkey."

WEU Assembly Session

LD281140 Moscow TASS in English 1113 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Luxembourg April 28 TASS -- An extraordinary session of the Assembly of the Western European Union is underway here. Parliamentarians of seven countries -- Britain, Italy, France, FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are discussing East-West relations, prospects of disarmament in Europe in the light of the new Soviet initiatives. A number of participants in the meeting called upon the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union to elaborate the common stand of the "Seven" towards the Soviet proposal aimed at elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

Deputy head of government and foreign minister of Luxembourg Jacques Poos will speak to the parliamentarians today. Jacques Poos is now chairman of the Council of the Western European Union.

The foreign and defence ministers of the countries, members of the Western European Union, have also got down to discussions here today.

Belgium: Agreement Favored

LD301729 Moscow TASS in English 1615 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Brussels April 30 TASS -- The Bureau of the Belgian Government coalition Christian People's Party has come out in favour of the earliest conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

The party's executive at a session on Wednesday opposed the advancing of any conditions that might hinder or complicate the conclusion of a medium-range missile agreement.

The Christian Democrats maintained that talks on reducing shorter-range missiles and conventional arms should be started in the same spirit.

The Western European countries should urgently work out a unified stance on disarmament and detente in Europe and around the world, it was pointed out at the session.

Danish Resolution

LD302058 Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Copenhagen April 30 TASS -- Today the Danish Folketing (parliament) unanimously passed a resolution making it incumbent on the government to back at NATO and other organizations the conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on withdrawing medium-range missiles from Europe and of a treaty which would free Europe from nuclear arms to the maximum possible extent.

Spain Agrees 'In Principle'

LD301801 Moscow TASS in English 1631 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Paris April 30 TASS -- TASS correspondent Iigran Liloyan reports:

In principle Spain backs the proposal on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe, Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez said here today. He pointed out

that Spain had no nuclear weapons and did not wish their deployment. The head of the Spanish Foreign Office spoke at a press conference after the end of the negotiations with French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond. The France Presse Agency reports that the two sides pointed to the concurrence of their stands on East-West relations and disarmament issues.

Italian CP Leader Comments

LD042215 Moscow TASS in English 2155 GMT 4 May 87

[Text] Rome May 4 TASS -- "The prospect for the resumption of the policy of detente, even if in conditions of strong opposition, is increasing. We are possibly at a turning point. The agreement on complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, which should be concluded within a short period of time, has become possible". General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party Allesandro Natta said this today at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Italian Communist Party. "This agreement would lead not only to limitation and control, but also to reduction of nuclear arsenals of the USA and the USSR", he went on. Emphasizing the importance of such an agreement, Natta said that there is no alternative to agreed-upon, balanced and verifiable disarmament.

The general secretary of the Italian Communist Party declared: "We have been absolutely right in positively assessing and supporting the course of the new Soviet leadership. Europe is vitally interested in declaring for overcoming the positions which could be an obstacle to the working out of the subsequent, more scopeful agreements in the sphere of disarmament. What is meant is above all the stand of the Reagan administration which stubbornly declares in defence of SDI, the arbitrary interpretation and substantial violation of the ABM Treaty", the speaker said.

The plenary meeting has on the agenda "communists' tasks and proposals for the implementation of the new political stage in the life of the republic".

Paris' Stand Denounced

LD231010 Moscow TASS in English 0931 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Paris April 30 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikita Yermakov reports:

Jean-Claude Gayssot, a member of the Politburo, secretary of the French Communist Party Central Committee, has denounced a non-constructive stand taken by the French leadership on issues of disarmament. Paris is now trying to explain to other West European countries why it is allegedly dangerous to disarm, he told a press conference.

All these reservations are not justified and, moreover, are an obstacle to advancement along the road of disarmament, the member of the French Communist Party leadership stressed. He said that in launching its peace initiatives, the Soviet Union took into account French apprehensions by proposing a solution to the problem of shorter-range nuclear missiles, chemical weapons and conventional armaments.

Chirac, Kohl Confer

ED032131 Moscow TASS in English 2033 GMT 3 May 87

[Text] Bonn May 3 TASS -- Prime Minister Jacques Chirac of France and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany met in Strausbourg, eastern France, today.

According to the West German news agency DPA, they tried to work out a common position on the Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

Chirac and Kohl, DPA reported, came out in favour of Soviet-American accords that would remove medium-range missiles from Europe first.

After the meeting the West German chancellor expressed the hope that talks on the "zero option" proper would soon begin, that verification problems would be solved and a relevant treaty would be concluded.

Prime Minister Chirac said that France had supported the proposal on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

As to the shorter-range missiles, the DPA described the position of the sides as rather restrained. Kohl and Chirac said they had no sufficient information on the matter and needed detailed consultations with the United States and the European NATO allies.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW RADIO TALK SHOW ON EUROPEAN RESPONSE ON INF

LD031946 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 3 May 87

[*"International Observers Roundtable"* program with Nikolay Ivanovich Agayants, foreign political commentator for All-Union Radio and Central Television; Gennadiy Arkadyevich Shishkin, first deputy general director of TASS; and Doctor of Historical Sciences Boris Dmitriyevich Dmitriev, international affairs journalist]

[Excerpt] [Agayants]

Gennadiy Arkadyevich, you were in Prague covering the visit of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the CSSR; I think you'll agree with me that this event has left a deep and indelible trace in the memory and in the hearts of millions of Czechs and Slovaks. Tell us about it, please, in more detail.

[Shishkin] Nikolay Ivanovich, I certainly still retain in my memory vivid pictures of Mikhail Sergeyevich's visit to Prague, which was an occasion of truly national rejoicing, and of the unfeigned enthusiasm with which the people of Prague welcomed our leader. I would say, too, that the visit has had a huge impact throughout the world — particularly the very important and fundamental proposals Mikhail Sergeyevich put forward in his speech at the meeting in Prague.

What we're talking about, of course, is a very important step toward a nuclear-free Europe that the Soviet Union has suggested taking, and that has evoked a very big response throughout the world. In order that we may fully appreciate the constructive significance of our new initiatives, I would like to remind you that the United States disavowed its own zero option on medium-range missiles in Europe under the pretext that it had been linked in the Reykjavik package with other problems of nuclear disarmament. Yet when the Soviet Union untied that package by offering to decide at once, and separately, the question of abolishing the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the United States and NATO straightaway linked this problem with the question of the Soviet operational and tactical missiles.

In view of the West's expressed concern about the problem of these missiles, and desiring to make it easier to conclude a medium-range missile agreement without delay, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed willingness in Prague to solve this problem constructively also, without tying it to the progress and outcome of efforts to resolve the problem of medium-range missiles. With this aim, the Soviet Union proposed beginning discussion of the question of reducing and later eliminating missiles with a range of 500-1000 km sited on the continent of Europe. For the period of the talks,

the sides would undertake not to increase the number of these missiles. That initiative was further continued and developed at the talks held between the Soviet leadership and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz in Moscow. During those talks, the Soviet side, again in view of the position of the West, went still further than what had been said in Prague, and proposed that operational and tactical missiles and battlefield missiles should also be abolished.

So we can see that the Soviet Union has demonstrated the maximum of goodwill and done everything to solve the problems of medium-range missiles; and if these were solved, this would, in turn, create better conditions for beginning a real process of stopping the nuclear arms race, reducing nuclear weapons and improving the international situation as a whole.

[Dmitriyev] The Soviet leadership in Moscow is attentively following the progress of discussion of matters connected with the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles. Both in Washington and in other West European capitals of the NATO states, these proposals of ours are being discussed.

It must be said that the recent talks between the French and British prime ministers have made a noticeable mark on the European political landscape of late, and have been a prominent feature of it. The impression is that both in Paris and London they are more concerned about their nuclear privileges, which pay political rather than military dividends. It goes without saying that we allow neither the positive nor the negative statements about the Soviet proposals to pass unnoticed, and in this connection I would like to draw attention to an interview with U.S. Secretary of State Shultz recently broadcast to Western Europe, in which he tried to answer the question of how the security of the NATO states would be affected if the Soviet proposals were implemented. I must say that the secretary of state offered a number of considerations one can only agree with.

To begin with, the U.S. secretary of state drew attention in that radio interview to the fact that the Soviet proposals are about reducing those same Soviet medium-range missiles for the removal of which the NATO countries have been pressing all along, and against which, in the words of George Shultz, the deployment of the U.S. Pershing-2's and cruise missiles was originally undertaken. Now, says the U.S. secretary of state, we have before us the prospect of the elimination, on the Soviet side, of about 1,200 warheads on such missiles, and on the U.S. side, of 200 warheads on missiles already deployed [razvernuty]. Of course we have to be cautious, said Shultz, but, he continued, the West should not be afraid to take "yes" for an answer to its own proposals.

[Shishkin] Boris Dmitriyevich, it would seem then, in light of what you have just been saying, that Western Europe ought to seize the new Soviet proposal with both hands. But in fact, what happens? The reaction among the ruling circles of NATO is quite different. Just as after Reykjavik, again their response is one of alarm and consternation.

[Dmitriyev] I would not put a final period here. I would suggest we might agree on this assessment of the Western reaction: In the Western capitals, in the Western governments, there is a process of acute struggle now going on over the Soviet proposals. Various points of view and various opinions are being expressed. And as yet there is no unified position. There is no unified position in Bonn, for example. In any case we don't yet know of any final and conclusive statement by Chancellor Kohl containing a final assessment of the Soviet initiatives. On the other hand, in those same West German political circles, there have been quite a few statements of a

positive kind. Take, for instance, a number of statements by the Federal Republic foreign minister, Genscher -- to say nothing of the Social Democrats. In short, summing up this part of our conversation, I would say that our Western opponents have not yet given their final answer. They are in the process of working out what stages they are going to adopt. We would like the answer they give in reply to our proposals to be positive.

[Agayants] Thanks to their responsible and realistic approach to the problems of war and peace, the socialist countries have won widespread recognition for their peace-loving proposals.

Occupying a special place among them is the concept of a fully comprehensive system of international security, the program for a nuclear-free world and abolition of all weapons of mass destruction. These, translated to the practical plane, are the Soviet proposals put forward at Reykjavik, and the program developed in the subsequent speeches by Comrade Gorbachev: notably in his speech at the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship meeting at the Prague Palace of Culture. Those initiatives have been seen throughout the world as an embodiment of the new political thinking. They have opened a fundamentally new chapter in the struggle to remove the threat of a nuclear catastrophe -- the struggle for human survival.

So on 27 April, as you know, at the plenary session of the delegations at the latest round of the Soviet-U.S. talks being held in Geneva for the medium-range missile group, our side submitted a draft for a treaty between the USSR and the United States that would abolish the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and provide for other measures to limit and reduce the medium-range missiles of the USSR and United States. That step has been taken.

[Dmitriyev] Yes, our delegation has submitted its draft treaty to abolish the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles [sredniye rakety] sited in Europe. The United States had earlier submitted its draft; so there are now two drafts on the table at the Geneva talks. The work of comparing particular provisions of these two documents has just begun. The work will, of course, be laborious and fairly slow, though it is our conviction that there is no reason it should not be completed in a very short space of time.

It should be said that our draft represents a compromise. It reflects a number of elements of the U.S. position, of the U.S. draft. Here, we are showing flexibility. For example, we accept the U.S. position on dividing medium-range missiles and launching facilities into deployed [razvornutyy] and undeployed missiles. We have adopted the U.S. approach on a gradual reduction of missile weapons. In short it is indeed a constructive and compromise document, which provides a way out to a speedy conclusion of the necessary agreement.

[Shishkin] Well then, Boris Dmitriyevich, how would you regard the varying positions that are now being expressed in the West in relation to the U.S. Pershing missiles? One could start, for instance, with the fact that General Rogers, the U.S. general who is commander in chief of NATO forces in Europe, has openly put forward a proposal and initiative, and is even insisting that the Pershings should not be eliminated, but that one of their stages be removed and they be transformed into operational and tactical missiles, and that, so to speak, negotiations should begin immediately about the level of these missiles.

There is another approach. For example, the West Germans, as is known, possess 72 Pershing-1 operational and tactical missiles. Indeed they do belong to the West

Germans. They are U.S. missiles, but they have been purchased by the West Germans. However, the nuclear warheads on them remain American and they belong to the United States. Naturally, these missiles are just as much of a threat as all the rest, and one would think that they should be subject to the same restrictions and that all the provisions of a treaty on this class of weapon should extend to them too. But what claims are now being made by the U.S. side? It is saying: No, it is only a question of delivery vehicles and these belong to West Germany, that is, to a third country that is to say that there are no grounds to speak about these missiles. How would you comment on this standpoint?

[Dmitriyev] Our draft agreement provides for many of the points you have mentioned, Gennadiy Arkadyevich. In particular, unlike the U.S. draft, which provides for the possibility of modernizing and transforming missiles of greater capacity into ones of less capacity, our Soviet draft definitively says: No, conversions and transformation of Pershing-2 missiles into missiles of shorter range are impermissible. All medium-range missiles currently located in Europe must go under the knife, to put it crudely. They must be dismantled and destroyed. In short, in the Soviet draft all problems are to be solved in full accordance with the aims of lowering the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, and indeed throughout the world.

[Agayants] Well, all that we have already said here is fresh evidence that the new political thinking, which is characteristic of our state at present, is having a colossal influence on the processes taking place throughout the world. This new thinking on international problems and the restructuring taking place in the foreign-policy activities of our state have naturally not gone unnoticed in the west. Our ideological opponents are reacting to this in different ways. There is a very wide-ranging scale of attitudes towards the processes taking place in our country. Some people are not averse to pouring abuse on us and slandering us. However, more and more frequently abuse and out and out anti-Sovietism are being replaced by attempts to analyze soberly the existing situation, understand it, and find ways for contacts and a joint solution of key problems.

In this context I think that an article by Mortimer Zuckerman, editor in chief of the weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, is indicative. The article was carried in the 27 April edition of the magazine. After beginning by reiterating a selection of stereotyped phrases about our society being some sort of totalitarian regime, about some mythical expansionist policy on the part of the USSR and about the fact that the United States allegedly fears not only a nuclear war with the Soviet Union but also its peaceful imperial intentions, as the text of the article put it, Zuckerman goes on to say that an important new fact in present day international relations has been -- and I quote -- the entry upon the stage of the charming and energetic Gorbachev and his circle, people who have brought fresh thinking, fresh ideas and a new openness. Thus, the magazine notes, instills the hope that important accords will be achieved and that a solution of the arms race problems will be discussed in a spirit of the motto "Let's and let live!" Well, let us leave this overly free-and-easy motto to the conscience of the author. What is symptomatic to my mind is the fact that even U.S. ruling circles are now giving more and more serious thought to the issue of how to go on living and what to do to achieve at least some kind of accords and to finally get some movement in solving all the explosive problems that have accumulated. It would be a fine thing if correct words were followed by correct deeds.

[Shishkin] Nikolay Ivanovich, I think that from this viewpoint another very important factor is that the USSR's consistent and very concrete and principled struggle for disarmament is now beginning to enjoy mounting support not just in Western Europe but in the United States too. Americans are more and more frequently rebuffing the Pentagon's militarist intrigues. As just one example I should like to cite the opinion

of Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, who literally stated the following: The U.S. military doctrine, he said, is based on the extremely erroneous and dangerous supposition that it is possible to wage nuclear war and achieve victory. Halperin goes on to say that the U.S. military and political leadership, in drawing up its strategic plans, is counting on being able to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and in this connection he emphatically rejects this, as he put it, criminal and suicidal doctrine, which, he says, threatens the whole of world civilization with destruction.

Here is another American scientist, (Berkovich), a specialist from the New York World Politics Institute; He came up with a sharp exposure of the Pentagon's myth about the Soviet threat. Here is what he wrote: Many specialists in the field of defense regard the idea of the USSR's overpowering superiority in terms of conventional weapons as a myth that is being irresponsibly spread by the unscrupulous media and by the Defense Department, which is trying to get its budget increased. Sentiments like these have become so widespread in the United States that the White House is forced to take them into account.

Take for example Reagan's latest radio address on the issues of Soviet-U.S. relations. He noted in it, I quote, that today the United States and the Soviet Union have an opportunity to achieve, step by step, a palpable, gradual progress on the way toward strengthening peace in the world. I think, at present, it is difficult to say yet whether the United States is really prepared to go its part of the distance toward a nuclear-free Europe or whether the optimistic pronouncements now coming from Washington are nothing more than a forced gesture to calm those who demand a constructive reply from the White House to the Soviet initiatives.

[Dmitriyev] Well, let us at the moment refrain from jumping to final deductions and conclusions on what is going on in the leadership of the United States and other NATO states. But you, Gennadiy Arkadyevich, are absolutely right in the sense that certain new thoughts and new trends have been cropping up lately within the leadership of the United States and NATO countries, and, first of all, in connection with our initiatives on the liquidation of missiles. We have, of course, no intention to go into detail about the internal affairs of the North Atlantic bloc or get involved in analyzing relations between the United States and its West European allies; one cannot fail, however, to notice the judiciously balanced, and one might say, sensible character, of certain statements now being made in Washington. It seems there is movement in the right direction and the conversations and discussions that took place in the course of the recent Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow when Secretary of State Shultz visited our capital have not been wasted.

[Agayants] I would like to draw your attention, comrades, to one more fact. In accordance with an agreement that has been reached, another conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee will take place at the end of May this year, in Berlin.

[Dmitriyev] There is no doubt that the forthcoming conference of the Political Consultative Committee will become an event of great international significance. The allied fraternal socialist states are now coordinating their foreign political activity more and more. Practically not a single major international decision is now made without harmonizing and unifying our efforts. The collective possibilities of the Warsaw Pact organization are being effectively used in the interests of the consolidation of European and universal peace.

Let us recall that at the previous conference of the Political Consultative Committee that took place in 1986 in Budapest, an enormously important program for reducing the

fronting armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states was put forward. Of course, we do not know at the moment the agenda of the forthcoming conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin, but there is no doubt that the most essential and key problems of the current international situation will be submitted for discussion by the leaders of the allied countries.

Of late, this detailed and profound conversation concerning issues and problems of that sort has been going on continuously. In connection with our proposals on the liquidation of medium-range missiles, thorough consultations have been held with our allies. To begin with, this issue was discussed during Comrade Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow. After that special representatives of the Soviet leadership visited Berlin, Prague, Sofia, Budapest and Bucharest. Comrade Bessmertnykh, deputy minister of USSR foreign affairs, met leaders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia in Berlin and Prague, for example. Comrade Loginov, deputy minister of foreign affairs, visited other allied states. And everywhere our proposals were met with utmost and firm support by our allies; in all the allied capitals, approval for our far-reaching initiatives in the international arena was voiced.

[Agayants] I think, we will close today's talks on this optimistic note. Our program's time is up. Thank you, comrades, for listening to us, and all the best to you.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA VIEWS FRG ARGUMENTS IN EUROMISSILE DEBATE

PM011225 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 87 Second Edition p 5

[Correspondent Yu. Yakhontov dispatch: "Arguing on the Rhine..."]

[Text] Bonn, 30 Apr -- FRG ruling circles currently see the desire to work out a unified position with regard to the Soviet proposals on both medium-range missiles in Europe and on operational and tactical weapons on the continent as their main foreign policy task.

The question of the attitude to medium-range missiles does not produce any particular dissension, at least at the moment. Experience suggests, however, that it is hard to predict what the situation will be like tomorrow, since, whenever it is a question of Soviet disarmament proposals, the opinions and positions of the ruling circles here often change.

Currently, all the objections from the leaders of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] bloc and its parliamentary faction are focused against M.S. Gorbachev's recent proposal on expanding the "zero option" and examining the question of withdrawing and scrapping operational and tactical missiles. The proposal is opposed by faction chairman A. Dregger, his deputy V. Ruehe, and FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner.

Citing what they claim to be the Soviet Union's threefold superiority in conventional arms, they do not want to permit even the idea of a nonnuclear Europe or to give up the U.S. nuclear shield.

The explanation of such a diehard stance (there is no other word for it) lies not so much in the USSR's "superiority," as in the intention to win for themselves -- that is, for the West -- the right to "arms upgrading" in the sphere of operational and tactical missiles. But, as the Bonn newspaper GENERAL ANZEIGER wrote, the Soviet proposals do not undermine NATO'S deterrence capability, since the bloc will continue to have a "wide range of sea-, ground-, and air-launched missile weapons, cruise missiles, missile-carrying aircraft and nuclear artillery" at its disposal.

Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher is convinced that it is necessary to approach the Soviet proposals seriously. The same view is held by the Free Democratic faction in the Bundestag headed by W. Mischnick, who believes that the proposals to scrap operational and tactical missiles should not be brushed aside but studied without any prejudice.

Former Federal Chancellor H. Schmidt stated in an interview with the newspaper MUENCHER ABENDZEITUNG that it is stupid to link the "zero option" on medium-range missiles in Europe with the problem of imbalance in the conventional arms sphere. The East's superiority in this area existed long before NATO adopted the "two-track decision" (that is, before 1979), and it has not changed since.

In short, the disagreement in the Bonn political hierarchy is graphic testimony that the CDU/CSU leadership does not want the "zero option" for operational and tactical missiles and does not want to scrap battlefield tactical missiles. And the references to Soviet superiority are just a convenient smoke screen for the opponents of disarmament to prevent the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe and to implement arms upgrading plans.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET MILITARY PAPER ASSAILS FRENCH STRATEGIC BUILDUP PLANS

PM061015 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[Colonel L. Levadov article: "Course of 'Nuclear Deterrence'; France's Military Program"]

[Text] The French National Assembly has approved the latest 5-year plan for developing the country's armed forces. The wide-ranging program worked out by the J. Chirac government for building up French nuclear, chemical, and conventional arms is typified first and foremost by its unprecedented scale. Totaling Fr474 billion -- a record for the entire postwar period -- spending on equipping the army, air force, and navy in 1987-91 is planned to increase by 6-11 percent per year. As a result, spending will rise by more than 50 percent over the 5 years, which is an absolute record for all the NATO countries, including the United States.

The new military program is the logical continuation of the political course proclaimed by the government of right-wing parties immediately after it came to power in March 1986. In his first speeches Prime Minister J. Chirac stated that "nuclear deterrence" remains the "cornerstone of the national security system," and that the quantity and quality of conventional arms must ensure that the French Army can "intervene effectively" in Central Europe.

Even today, when an active struggle has been launched worldwide to eradicate the nuclear threat and to build a nuclear-free and nonviolent world, the French ruling circles continue to demonstrate their blind adherence to the notorious "deterrence and containment" doctrine.

As if there had been no Soviet program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, no proposals from the Warsaw Pact states on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and no Soviet proposals to eliminate medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe. In this regard one cannot fail to concur with the French communist newspaper L'HUMANITE, which called the new military program a throwback to cold war times.

One is struck by the stubborn reluctance to back away even slightly from the stereotyped thinking that has prevailed for many years. "There are no grounds for supposing that the military threat hanging over us will undergo quantitative or qualitative changes in the future which would force France to substantially change the scale of the strategic nuclear defense it needs," we read in the text of the law on the new military program. And Fr152 billion are being allocated to develop national nuclear forces in support of this "argument."

It is planned to channel a large part of those funds into modernizing nuclear submarines -- the main component of the French nuclear "triad." By 1992 it is planned to complete the program for rearming the "Redoutable"-class SSBN's with M4 ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVed warheads. If the French nuclear fleet is maintained at the existing level (six submarines), this move alone will ensure that its capability in terms of the number of nuclear charges that could be launched at once will increase by 170 percent (from 176 to 496), while its capability in terms of maximum strike range will almost double (from 3,200 to 6,000 km). At the same time, it is planned to start building new-generation SSBN's equipped with M5 MIRVed missiles.

In the coming 5-year period it is planned to further develop air- and ground-launched nuclear means. It is planned to equip French Air Force and Navy aircraft -- Mirage IV strategic bombers, Mirage 2000 fighter-bombers, and carrier-borne Super Etandard attack aircraft -- with ASMP nuclear cruise missiles with a range of up to 350 km.

The plan for developing ground forces outlines the development [razrabotka] of S4 mobile strategic missile complexes, which will eventually replace the S3 missiles stored in 18 silo launch installations on the Albion Plateau in southern France. Series production of new Hades operational and tactical missiles with a range of up to 350 km will begin in the next few years.

Thus, in 5 years time, along with notable improvements in range and accuracy, the French strategic nuclear forces and the total number of charges that they can put aloft in one launch (sortie) will reach 532 and, as Western military specialists see it, could exceed 700 by the year 2000.

Is that a lot or a little? Judge for yourselves. In 1980, when the French strategic nuclear forces hardly numbered 100 warheads, Paris LE MONDE published specialist estimates suggesting that these means could wipe out 20 million inhabitants of the Soviet Union's largest cities, not to mention the many millions who would be wounded or crippled. We recall that France, like the United States and Britain, stubbornly refuses to commit itself to non-first use of nuclear weapons, has hitherto failed to join the Nonproliferation Treaty, and takes a negative attitude to the question of the complete ending of nuclear tests. From this angle the program for further building up French military might, and primarily its nuclear forces, becomes understandable.

Probably the most sensational section of the new French military program is the plan to build up chemical arms, to which Fr700 million have been allocated. According to LE MATIN, what is striking is not so much the official admission of the existence of stockpiles of such weapons in the country and of an industrial base for their production, as the timing of the release of this report to the public. Indeed, the French decision on chemical arms upgrading was taken 2 weeks after the Warsaw Pact states published their statement calling on the NATO countries to "embark in the very near future on the total and universal elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production."

The military 5-year plan devotes great attention to the program for the development of conventional arms with a view to creating by the year 2000 an army whose might, in the words of defense Minister A. Giraud, will depend not on numbers but first and foremost on strike capability, firepower, and the provision of electronic, infrared, and laser equipment, automation, and computers. And they are gambling on developing highly accurate strike means and on bringing the tactical and technical characteristics of weapons and military hardware more closely into line with accepted NATO standards. The total cost of the conventional weapons and military hardware for the ground forces, air force, and navy and the work on future models will cost more than Fr312 billion.

Within the vast program for building up French Conventional Forces people in the West are spotlighting several projects which, in the opinion of military specialists, are of fundamental importance. These are primarily the Leclerc tank, the Rafale combat aircraft, the AWACS long-range early-warning system, and the nuclear aircraft carrier Richelieu.

Conceived as a fighting machine for the 21st century, the Leclerc, unlike all previous French models, will have virtually identical tactical and technical characteristics to the U.S. Abrams and West German Leopard tanks. This approach is conditioned by the revised concept in recent years of the use of French troops in NATO operations in Central Europe. Whereas previously the 1st Army was seen mainly as a reserve for the commander in chief of the bloc's forces in the military theater, now, as the experience of exercises has shown, its army corps could operate together with the allies in "forward positions" -- that is, in the first echelon of the NATO strike grouping aimed against the GDR and the CSSR. These questions will be developed in the joint West German and French "Kecker Spatz" exercise scheduled for this September.

The planned purchases of three U.S. AWACS-SYSTEM aircraft are the main component in France's de facto integration into the NATO military organization. After all, it is these NATO aircraft that constantly carry out airborne radar intelligence-gathering missions against the socialist community countries' territories.

In the next 5 years it is planned to carry out the bulk of the work on building and to launch the first French nuclear aircraft carrier -- the Richelieu. It is also planned to build a second ship of this class. The creation of a French nuclear strike fleet attests to the firm intention of the country's military-political leadership to maintain France's ability to defend its neocolonialist aspirations in all corners of the globe.

To a considerable extent the steps being taken to improve the training of the French Rapid Development Force -- which already comprises five divisions -- have the same aim. Around 100 military transports and the necessary naval transport will be put on constant combat standby in order to ensure their rapid transfer to any region where the interests of French monopolies or their allies are affected.

Thus, the new French military program convincingly attests that, despite the statements by its official spokesmen about its desire for peace and universal security, France's priorities lie not in the disarmament area but in the area of building up its own military potential and increasing the role of nuclear forces in that potential. The country's ruling circles are thereby demonstrating their adherence to obsolete, stereotyped political thinking and their stubborn desire to build national security on the path of the arms race alone. Hence the restrained position adopted by the French Government with regard to the Soviet proposals on nuclear and conventional arms reductions in Europe.

It is time for those who determine France's political course to realize that the arms race will not lead to a strengthening of stability and security but to a universal tragedy. That is why the question of the need to smash the nuclear guillotine and stop detaching politics from common human norms of morality is raised more acutely than ever today. It is time to heed the voice of the peoples, including the French people themselves, who resolutely reject the prospect of nuclear incineration or chemical poisoning. And this must be done forthwith, right now -- because tomorrow could be too late.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA DECRIES FRENCH EFFORT TO 'DELAY' INF SOLUTION

PM071017 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent V. Bolshakov report: "Maneuvering In A Nuclear Impasse"]

[Text] Paris -- The latest Soviet proposals on eliminating nuclear missiles in Europe have been greeted with official silence in Paris. There has been no reaction to them from the Elysee Palace (the president's residence), the Hotel Matignon (the Prime Minister's residence), or the French Foreign Ministry, even after the French delegation's return from Brussels where G. Shultz had been reporting to America's NATO allies on his Moscow talks.

This silence speaks volumes. LE MONDE writes: "Paris is plunged into confusion."

Here is the reason for this "confusion." In March President Mitterrand, commenting on the "zero option," which envisages the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, stated: "There is a serious imbalance in shorter-range missiles -- between 100 and 1,000 km -- in Europe in the Soviet Union's favor. This imbalance must be rectified." Now, after M.S. Gorbachev's proposal to G. Shultz that short-range missiles be eliminated, too, Yves Moreau writes in L'HUMANITE, the President has fallen silent. Did this proposal to rectify the imbalance, about which he himself had spoken, not sound convincing?

Indeed, what is now preventing France from supporting those proposals for which its leaders themselves have campaigned? Even if they do not support them openly, they should at least try not to slow down their implementation.

France's leaders, LIBERATION writes, greeted the new Soviet proposals on the elimination of nuclear missiles in Europe "in a highly restrained if not overtly hostile way." French Prime Minister J. Chirac confirmed this in characteristic fashion during his recent talks in London with M. Thatcher. He stated bluntly that France has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons and is going to develop its cooperation with Britain in the sphere of arms improvement.

F. Fillon, representative of the ruling Rally for the Republic and chairman of the National Assembly Defense Commission, gave the following explanation in an interview with Radio Luxembourg and Radio Europe: "What we feared has happened. When an agreement on Euromissiles is signed the issue of the French and British nuclear forces immediately arises." And even though there is no agreement as yet, the right-wing LE FIGARO has already announced that "Western Europe is left at the USSR's mercy" and M. Tatu, writing in LE MONDE, has even spoken about "collusion between the two superpowers."

The journalist B. Brigouleix, who is very well informed on the French capital's political ways, writes in *LE MONDE*, citing a figure "close to the president," that the Elysee seems to be responding to these "fears" with an Olympian calm. The belief is that the discussion now centers only on Soviet-U.S. Talks and Soviet and U.S. weapons in Europe. France, you must understand, can go on remaining aloof from all this.

So why have the Paris opponents of detente become so active now? In particular, they assert with particular stubbornness, as though trying to state the obvious, that USSR-U.S. talks on this score "do not affect France."

The USSR and U.S. positions on this score are identical -- that without French and British consent, their existing nuclear forces will not be taken into account in talks or in the conclusion of Soviet-U.S. agreements. This guarantee was given to France and Britain on the assumption that their strategic nuclear forces were not so great that the discussion of their reduction needed to begin until the USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals are considerably reduced. The attitude of Paris and London on this score is understandable. What is not understandable is why specifically even the remote prospect of such a discussion is perceived in France almost as setting the date of Judgment Day?

The present "confusion," or rather turmoil in Paris has clearly been caused by this prospect. The new Soviet initiatives put forward in Prague and Moscow clearly bring closer that time when nuclear disarmament in Europe will be impossible without involving France and Britain. After all, this is a question of the elimination in Europe of a whole class of nuclear missile armaments. Reduction to zero! It is thus somewhat hard to understand statements like "this does not affect France!"

Furthermore, it is clearly no coincidence that the Paris leadership itself is "hinting" via the press that it would like to receive from the Soviet Union right now not only confirmation of the view that "the French nuclear deterrent forces are not subject to discussion" but also the recognition that the French "prestrategic" nuclear weapons are an "integral part of the central system," that is of those selfsame "deterrent forces." Essentially this is a veiled demand that the French operational and tactical missiles with nuclear warheads be overlooked. Are those the only missiles they have in mind?

According to figures in *LE MATIN* on 14 April, France possesses 132 single warhead [odnozaryadnaya] missiles with a range of around 5,000 km. They are also part of the "deterrent forces," which are currently not subject to discussion. Furthermore, France has operational and tactical missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads (over a range of 400 km to 1,000 km). These include its 40 Pluton missiles and air-to-surface missiles. Finally, there are the aircraft suitable for use as nuclear bombers and the long-range weapons which are quite capable of firing atomic, including "neutron," shells.

If the official version is to be believed, this entire impressive arsenal has been created exclusively as "a means of defending the weak," that is, France, against the "strong." The name of the "strong" is not openly stated: Instead De Gaulle's concept of "omnidirectional defense" is cited as a cover, but when any mention of the "threat to French security" is made people have no qualms about pointing to the East.

Is there not a paradox here? At the very time when the two "strong" countries are seriously approaching the matter of radically reducing their own nuclear armaments in Europe, France had decided to rapidly build up its own arsenal. Parliament has passed the government's "unprecedented" 5-year military program, which will cost Fr474 billion.

The result of its implementation will be to increase the number of strategic nuclear warheads more than fourfold -- from 132 to almost 600. Hades tactical missiles and neutron weapons will also be adopted. Not to mention a new aircraft carrier, tanks, guns, and aircraft. In addition, as has been noted, France will also receive new types of chemical armaments, which will also count among the "deterrent forces."

It is clear that, since the right-wing government came to power in March last year, Paris has set out to abandon De Gaulle's concept of "deterrence" and has been moving toward the use of mass destruction weapons as an instrument of its policy.

A concrete manifestation of this is the idea of the "organization of a military Europe" within the WEU. Official Paris is campaigning so zealously for the cobbling together of this "NATO subsidiary" under its own aegis that the U.S. ambassador to France approvingly called it the "power behind" that subsidiary. "What disgrace for France to bear praise of this kind!" Was the comment of G. Marchais, secretary general of the French Communist Party and leader of the only political party in France to courageously oppose the arms race advocates.

However, Paris clearly does not want to acknowledge its own intentions and is trying to hide behind references to a "national consensus" in favor of the arms race. But does such a consensus actually exist?

First, the French Communist Party voted in parliament against the "5-year armaments plan" for 1987-91. Second, according to public opinion polls, 85 percent of French people believe that now, when talks are being conducted between the USSR and the United States, their country should make an active contribution to the disarmament cause. And 79 percent of the population are opposed to the idea of France's increasing its own nuclear arsenal in the event of a USSR-U.S. agreement being reached on medium-range missiles.

Paris is now strenuously trying to convince its allies that a response to the Soviet proposals "is to be expected imminently," as LIBERATION said. That was the point of the French delegation's maneuvers at the recent session of the WEU countries' foreign and defense ministers. That was why French Foreign Minister J.-B. Raimond went to Washington recently. And that, in particular, was what was under discussion at J. Chirac's recent meeting with H. Kohl.

The tactics of French diplomacy are quite transparent -- they are to delay as long as possible the solution of the question of "Euromissiles" and other nuclear arms in Europe.

One would like to think that Paris will cast off the shackles of outmoded thinking and understand the disputable truth that even the mightiest nuclear missiles arsenals cannot ensure real security in our age.

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CSO: 5200/1468

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: INTERVIEW WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

PM280915 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Apr 87 p 14

["Press Club" interview with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer F. Burlatskiy: "Giulio Andreotti: 'We Have a High Opinion of Gorbachev's Policy'"]

[Text] Rome -- [Burlatskiy] Mr Andreotti, as you know, the Soviet Union has recently put forward many initiatives to develop cooperation with Western countries in the disarmament sphere and in the economic and social fields in the spirit of new thinking. What are Italy's stance, interests, and goals in this process?

[Andreotti] Cooperation between Italy and the USSR has, I would say, been developing very well for a long time. In most recent times the Soviet leadership's policy within the country and in the international arena has facilitated this work. I would like to say that not only Mrs Thatcher, but we in Italy also have a high opinion of M. Gorbachev's policy. We believe that we, the Western countries, must for our part take important steps to develop dialogue on problems of peace and cooperation.

We are already seeing the first results in the dialogue process -- not only in blocking the arms race, but in starting effective arms reduction. Of course, there are many difficulties in the way and it is not easy changing the political line and political development in the world. But possibilities have arisen for overcoming these difficulties. This applies above all to our common work in the sphere of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. The problem of short-range missiles -- an area in which the Soviet Union has an advantage -- is also of great importance. As a matter of fact, there are two possible approaches to this problem.

One is for the United States to increase the number of short-range missiles to the Soviet level. The other is for the Soviet Union to reduce the number of missiles it has.

We attach great significance to the changes taking place inside the Soviet Union. For example, what happened in the case of Academician Sakharov meant that a serious argument had disappeared in the polemics between East and West.

Gestures by the Soviet Government regarding Jewish emigration and the opening of a consulate would be of considerable significance. This would remove the causes of friction and improve the psychological climate. The great step forward you have taken creates the possibility of holding an international conference on the Near East.

[Burlatskiy] There is a definite political asymmetry between the Soviet leadership's new thinking and new policy and our Western partners' position. Do the Western

countries, above all the U.S. Administration, have the political will to reach agreements? This question arises in particular because a series of conditions which could inhibit the talks process, in particular on short-range missiles and new forms of verification, have been put forward in response to the Soviet proposal on a zero option for medium-range missiles in Europe.

[Andreotti] My answer is, yes, the West, including the United States, has the will to conclude agreements on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. I believe also that it would be constructive to decide to freeze the installation of new short-range missiles and start conventional arms cuts. But, in my view, they ought not to be an obstacle at talks on medium-range missiles. Of course, there are people who still claim that the Soviet Union in fact does not want effective verification. But I think that recently the USSR has taken important steps in this sphere. It was a wise decision by the Soviet leadership to single out the question of the French and British nuclear missile potential. In my PRAVDA interview I said that in my view, when agreements have been reached between the USSR and the United States on disarmament problems, agreements relating to French and British missiles will also be possible. I was panned for this here, in Western Europe. But they were mistaken. Two years ago President F. Mitterrand said that the time would come to tackle these questions too.

[Burlatskiy] I have the impression that at least some countries in Western Europe which previously expressed particular concern in connection with SS-20 missiles and vigorously backed the zero option on medium-range missiles are now not only failing to encourage, but are in fact curbing the U.S. Administration's movement toward agreements with the USSR on this issue. What is the Italian Government's stance?

[Andreotti] We support the line formulated in Reykjavik and we are against keeping medium-range missiles on our continent. What they are saying in Europe is not quite what you said. They are saying that the autonomous defense of Western Europe must be seen to. If anyone had said after World War II that there would be 250,000 U.S. soldiers in Europe for 40 years, he would have been thought mad. But now it is not just a matter of accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Nor is it a matter of replacing U.S. forces with European forces. Personally I believe that, when it was concluded in Helsinki that the United States and Canada would participate in the solution of European problems, it was an intelligent gesture reflecting historical development.

[Burlatskiy] But I would like to have a clearer picture of what contribution Western Europe itself could make to the solution of problems of cooperation on our continent.

[Andreotti] I believe it could be made in two areas. First: Developing relations between CEMA and the Common Market, in such a way, of course, that it does not hinder bilateral relations but adds something to them. Second: Focusing efforts on cooperation in the scientific and humanitarian sphere -- in joint investigation and research. The agreements concluded within the framework of a "World Laboratory" are an important step forward on this path, as indeed is the seminar on nuclear research.

As you know, we have put forward a slogan: "Scientists' Republic" -- science without frontiers and without secrets. It is necessary open up laboratories and create new opportunities for the exchange of knowledge. Conditions whereby any scientist from any country can cross any border unhindered and meet with his colleagues.

[Burlatskiy] An understanding has been reached on a visit to Italy by M.S. Gorbachev, which both sides believe would play a big part in developing Soviet-Italian relations. What is the situation regarding the Italian side's position in present conditions?

[Andreotti] We are going through a difficult period. I hope that we will be able to overcome the political crisis before the summer. We are confident that we will be able to receive M. Gorbachev some time this year. I hope M. Gorbachev will make the visit.

[Burlatskiy] How can the political crisis in Italy be overcome and when?

[Andreotti] We wanted to achieve agreements to enable parliament to continue operating until the end of its term. But we have failed to reach an agreement with Italian Socialist Party leader B. Craxi. No doubt everyone is equally to blame for the situation.

I believe that an early election will change nothing as far as the different parties' positions are concerned, which would not make the problem of an agreement any easier. I believe that temperament has a big part to play here. I am a Roman, so I am a calmer person, perhaps. Of course, we will find a way, just as we have found a way over the last 40 years, fully in line with the principles of our constitution.

[Burlatskiy] Have you anything to say to the readers of LITERAIURNAYA GAZETA, to all Soviet people?

[Andreotti] I would like to see our countries come closer and closer together and to see this rapprochement not only occur at government level, but extend more and more widely to the people's masses. I would like to give you a small personal souvenir that I ordered myself: It is a Roman cat, a symbol of goodness and humanity. I ordered this symbol for the very reason that during the war and the occupation we ate all the cats, and Italians now have particularly tender feelings for the animal.

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CSO: 5200/1468

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR REVIEW OF UK BOOK ON ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 141-143

[Yu. Osetrov review: "In Defiance of Reason and Morality"]

[Text] "The appearance of nuclear weapons makes necessary a Copernican revolution in ideas on war" (p 2); "considering the monstrous destructive capability of nuclear weapons, can war with the use thereof be considered 'ethical'?" (p 15). We can guess in advance, it would seem, what a person who reasons in such a way will go on to say.

Nonetheless, D. Fischer, employee of the British Ministry of Defence, says in his book "Morality and the Bomb. On Ethical Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence" by no means what might have been expected considering the above propositions. In fact, an unequivocal conclusion suggests itself: using nuclear weapons means casting a flagrant challenge at elementary humanity. Throughout the first third of the book there is actually no assertion of anything which would differ from this truth.

But in one chapter he switches, for all that, to an examination of the possibilities of the use of nuclear weapons. And here the reader encounters a different approach evoking the most emphatic objections.

After all, it can in no way be said that D. Fischer is under a misapprehension concerning the apocalyptic dangers of nuclear war. The work abounds in references to them. There are the giant figures of anticipated losses--up to 160 million persons (in the United States alone), say, in the first 30 days of a full-scale thermonuclear conflict (p 51); mention of "nuclear winter"; and establishment of the fact that surviving humanity would be hopelessly crippled by the consequences of global radiation.

It is paradoxical that against the backdrop of these terrible truths a chain of reasoning unfolds whose ultimate link is the conclusion that nuclear weapons are not that bad a thing and that their use under certain circumstances should not cause objections. We are faced with a dangerous logic aimed at justifying the use of nuclear arms. It is adorned with fanciful constructions of arguments intended to damp down the natural protest of reason and the senses against such a recommendation.

Such "logic" could, of course, be completely ignored were it the product of the "thoughts" of a lone madman. But the views of D. Fischer are not simply his own work (although he makes a certain individual contribution). Among his arguments there are also those with which aggressive circles of the West and NATO strategists and propagandists wish to justify the permissibility of nuclear war. They are endeavoring to compel people not only to reconcile themselves to such a prospect but also to agree that such a war could be reasonable and advisable.

The author begins with an attempt to attribute--however unnatural this may be--nuclear war to the just wars category. In order to succeed here he construes the category in his own way, "freeing" it of sociopolitical aspects and reducing the characteristics of a just war mainly to noninjury to the peaceful population (pp 49, 58). But nor can such an interpretation in itself impart an "acceptable" appearance to nuclear war--the less so in that it is a question of a nuclear confrontation, that is, one that is particularly destructive and catastrophic in its consequences. In the attempts to overcome this contradiction the author has literally to deform logic. "It is claimed," he acknowledges, "that there can be no just end for nuclear war" (it is easy to understand those who think thus: with what justice could the annihilation of civilization be compatible?). Nonetheless, for D. Fischer "this is a vague assertion" (p 55). The author declares that nuclear war may be fought such that losses are incurred only by military units and that the peaceful population and the environment would not suffer (p 58). He also attempts to make to the idea of so-called "clean nuclear war," which has become a widespread cliche of NATO propaganda, his own contribution by an illustration: the use of nuclear warheads in the form of depth charges for combating submarines. But it is clear that in this case it would be practically impossible to avoid an escalation of the nuclear conflict with all its consequences, not to mention the obvious ecological damage.

But it is hard for the British specialist attempting to fit nuclear war into the just wars category when he attempts to prove that it might not do "inordinate" damage to the peaceful population. Not in a position to assert such a thing directly, he refers to the fact that even in nonnuclear wars there have been episodes when the civilian population has incurred huge losses. The reader himself, of course, will evaluate the "persuasiveness" of the sophist proposition according to which since there has been evil before, it is perfectly acceptable to repeat it--the more so in that in the event of a nuclear conflict the scale of the evil will--there can be no doubting this--not simply be repeated but exceeded a thousand times over.

Evidently recognizing the extent to which such reasoning is capable of evoking protest, not to mention disagreement on the part of the readers, the author introduces a reservation: in any event, nuclear weapons must be used as a final, extreme means, when all others have been exhausted (also classic NATO reasoning: the North Atlantic bloc will use nuclear weapons first if there are no other means to confront the "enemy") (pp 56-57). The groundlessness of this reservation hardly needs comment. What very broad scope it affords for the use of nuclear weapons!

Concluding his attempts to portray nuclear war as acceptable, D. Fischer nonetheless assays an irresolute synopsis: some criteria of a just war do not preclude the use of nuclear weapons, others prevent it in some way (p 59).

From this, however, it should not be concluded that the author has hesitated as regards the soundness of his general principle. He devotes the second half of the work to efforts to otherwise buttress the proposition concerning the permissibility of a nuclear conflict--mainly with arguments to the effect that the Western countries' defense policy cannot be constructed on a basis other than a readiness to be the first to use nuclear weapons. "But in view of the now strong moral prejudice" against the use of the latter, we read, it is absolutely necessary to investigate "whether it is possible to formulate a logical and effective defense policy which is not based on nuclear weapons" (p 59). We would note at once that one is struck in the passage quoted by the substitution of concepts, which forms the basis of the British expert's further arguments. He attempts to refute the proposition that the world would be safer without nuclear weapons, but means here still to defend the viewpoint that the first use of such and use altogether under any circumstances are justified. Such an erroneous method of demonstration is born of a perfectly clear purpose: it is certainly easier for many Western readers to reconcile themselves to the fact of the existence of these weapons than with the blood-chilling prospect of their use.

But if it is possible to persuade the reader (this is the whole hope) that it is impossible to manage without such weapons "in the interests of security," it will be far simpler inculcating in him the idea that the latter may someday be activated.

Accordingly, D. Fischer tries in vain to prove that the West's armed forces have no alternative to the nuclear component.

He sets about examining hypothetical alternatives. He names as the first pacifism--complete renunciation of the use of weapons. We would note in passing that pacifism is not in the air in Western countries' policy today, but in this case this is not the point. Let us see what D. Fischer says. He says the following: the Western countries would find themselves unarmed in the face of the USSR and its allies, which would impose their will on them (p 62). So the "demonstration" of the unacceptability of pacifism amounts to slander of the socialist countries. The USSR is portrayed as an inexorable threat, which makes pacifism suicidal. And such malicious fabrications are being written precisely when it is the Soviet Union which is struggling for disarmament and the elimination of tension and the United States and its closest allies which are constantly spurning the peaceable initiatives of the socialist countries!

The second demonstration of the alleged impossibility for the West of parting with nuclear weapons is constructed on an even more distorted reality--if it can be even further distorted. D. Fischer asserts that nuclear disarmament, if offered by the West, would encounter the USSR's resistance, in which connection the very idea of such disarmament is pointless. But things are

today precisely the other way about: the Soviet Union is offering nuclear disarmament, and not simply as an ideal, what is more, but having charted a specific path of progress toward this goal.

D. Fischer examines one further alternative to the imperialist powers' nuclear arms (in order to reject it, of course): unilateral nuclear disarmament combined with a system of strategic defense (pp 65-66): the Western countries would take shelter behind an antimissile "shield," having simultaneously eliminated their strike potential. Even an option so "preferential" for the West (actively propagandized by certain circles in the United States, incidentally) is not to the author's liking. Nor, furthermore, is he disposed to go deeper into an analysis of the actual reasons owing to which such a "scenario" is unacceptable. The same "bold" argument here: the "Soviet threat". Since the USSR is hostile and armed with missiles, and a 100-percent defense against them is improbable, there is no point thinking about such plans even.

It is interesting that ultimately even mutual disarmament is rejected. Here also one is struck by the typically "confrontational" way of thinking of the pro-NATO figure. A mutual renunciation, he says, would only make the world more dangerous for now the "price" of an East-West conflict is very high (threat of thermonuclear catastrophe), but otherwise a confrontation would be facilitated (p 67). This entire logic is a different way of putting the same "Soviet military threat" proposition. When the arguments are exhausted--and what, in fact, can be said against mutual disarmament?--the final, crowning argument of anti-Sovietism is brought forth: the USSR is dangerous, consequently, there is no point talking about disarmament.

In conclusion (the chapter "Conclusions and a View to the Future") D. Fischer discusses whether it will be possible in the future to rid ourselves of nuclear weapons. He is generally optimistic, believing that nuclear disarmament will come about sometime and that interim steps to reduce the nuclear potential might be practicable (p 126). But let us not exaggerate the constructiveness of this approach: it is intended for the vague future. But for the present--weapons of mass destruction and the intensifying threat of war.

FOOTNOTE

* London and Sydney, Groom Helm, 1985, pp 136.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TASS ON U.S. SRINF PLANS--Washington, 6 May (TASS)--The U.S. Department of Defense is opposed to the Soviet proposal for a simultaneous elimination of Soviet and American shorter range missiles from Europe, the American television network CBS reported Tuesday. According to CBS, the Pentagon is considering plans for the development and deployment in European countries of a new shorter-range missile with a range of about 500 kilometers. To add substance to its plans for a new weapons the Pentagon refers to the need for extending protection to U.S. NATO allies, CBS noted. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0734 GMT 6 May 87 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/1468

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR 'READY' TO GUARANTEE NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR

LD051704 Moscow TASS in English 1641 GMT 5 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS -- Major General Yuriy Levedev, department deputy head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, called as important and timely the initiative by the Governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia on establishing a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe. Replying to a question by a TASS analyst, he said that today Europe was a place of the greatest concentration of armaments and a focal point of nuclear confrontation between the two military alliances. The obtaining situation here is fraught with a nuclear conflict due to the USA's desire to turn the region into a forward theatre of operations, far enough from its own territory. It is here, in Western Europe, that the United States set up over 150 depots, accumulating there over 7,000 nuclear warheads, both for its own delivery vehicles and for delivery vehicles of its NATO partners.

At the same time Europe can probably make the most effective first step along the way of saving mankind from the nuclear threat.

This chance is extended by the Soviet proposals aimed at freeing Europe from medium-range nuclear missiles and shorter-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 kilometres. The question of tactical nuclear systems in Europe could also be resolved at negotiations on reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals, proposed by the Warsaw Treaty member states in Budapest.

Proposals on establishing zones free from nuclear weapons in Europe would undoubtedly contribute to realizing this programme. The establishment of such a zone is necessary, above all, in central Europe.

It will be recalled that the Soviet Union immediately backed the initiative put forth by Sweden in December 1982 on establishing a 300-kilometre-wide zone, free from theatre of operations nuclear weapons (150 kilometres on each side of the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO). For the purpose of reducing the nuclear danger the USSR proposed that the zone be expanded to 500-600 kilometres (250-300 kilometres to the west and the east from the line of contact).

However, the USA and NATO took a negative stand on the question.

Calling on the FRG Government for conducting talks to establish a nuclear free corridor in central Europe, the Governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia proposed that its width be equal to 300 kilometres.

At first the corridor could be extended to some 150 kilometres on each side of the borderline so as to extend it, at the next stage, to the size of the central European nuclear-free zone within geographical limits determined by the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe. All nuclear arms systems are to be removed from the corridor on each side of the delimitation line between the alliances in Central Europe.

Such a corridor would be a specific contribution of relevant states to liquidating nuclear weapons in Europe and, thereby, a practical support for the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva. All nuclear weapons, including nuclear mines, theatre of operations and tactical missiles, atomic artillery, carrier planes of strike tactical aviation and anti-aircraft missile nuclear-capable systems would be subject to withdrawal from the corridor.

Comprehending the need for consolidating security in Europe, the Soviet Union is ready, on a mutual basis, to withdraw Soviet nuclear weapons from such a corridor and guarantee a nuclear-free status of such a zone. Now it is up to the NATO countries to respond, above all to the FRG to which the proposal by the GDR and Czechoslovakia is directly addressed.

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CSO: 5200/1465

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NORWEGIAN PAPER CITES DANGERS INHERENT IN NORDIC N-FREE ZONE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial: "The Nordic Zone"]

[Text] Foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg cannot be in favor of Iceland staying away from a joint Nordic position on a nuclear-free zone.

One can detect traces of sour faces before tomorrow's meeting of Scandinavian foreign ministers on Iceland. The bone of contention: the suggested joint statement on a nuclear-free zone in the North, which Iceland cannot agree to without reservations.

Foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg has confirmed that he would like to get the committee appointed during the meeting in Reykjavik. A wish--yes, but a demand--no. It benefits neither Scandinavian neighborliness nor a statement if the four other Nordic countries ran over Iceland and started the statement without it as Finland and Sweden are about to do.

If the Nordic countries which have chosen different security policy solutions should first agree to a joint statement on a nuclear-free zone, all must participate. This is contained in the word joint itself. A statement will provide the basis for a possible political decision, and if in this case this concerns five countries, especially strict demands must be made. The consequences of establishing a zone by treaty must be thought through, the objective of a treaty and the conditions for it must be thoroughly explained.

From the Norwegian side one precondition is that a nuclear-free zone must be seen in the context of a larger security policy solution in Europe. The development in recent times, both in weapons technology and in the relationship between East and West, has clearly supported this opinion.

At the security conference in Stockholm which concluded last September, the demand for active confidence-inspiring efforts persisted. It is no longer enough to simply declare one's good intentions, the words must be filled with content. A nuclear free zone is a passive measure which has no significance if it only confirms a situation which exists already. And the North is free of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the conclusion of a treaty can create new problems. A guarantee power outside the zone can demand inspection and control to ensure adherence to the treaty without granting such a right for inspection or control itself. Both neutral countries and countries in an alliance can get into difficulties.

A joint Nordic zone statement can clarify this and other conditions. But all have to agree.

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CSO: 5200/2435

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. SHIP IN JAPAN CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

LD050847 Moscow TASS in English 0803 GMT 5 May 87

[Text] Tokyo May 5 TASS -- The U.S. attack aircraft carrier "Midway" based in Japan has aboard nuclear weapons which officially are banned from being introduced to Japan. This is borne out by new facts revealed by the research group of the Japanese Communist Party in the Pentagon library.

It succeeded in finding a collection of photos of the aircraft carrier's crew there with a full list of its services mentioning among them 21 people from a special unit engaged in assembling, equipping and keeping secret ammunition.

Rear Admiral (retired) Eugene Carroll, former commander of the "Midway" and deputy director of the Washington Centre for Defence Information, said in an interview with the newspaper AKAHATA that this unit services nuclear weapons preparing them for installation in aircraft and immediate use in case a corresponding order is issued.

The fact that the "Midway" has nuclear weapons aboard is tantamount to their permanent deployment in Japan since this attack aircraft carrier has been officially registered at Port Yokosuka since 1973 and has entered it to carry out repairs and replenish stocks for over one hundred times since then.

Last month, the Communist Party of Japan published the text of a classified directive by the U.S. State Department of [words indistinct] the existence of secret agreements on the illegal introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. Faced with irrefutable facts, the United States was forced to admit the authenticity of this document.

Washington and Tokyo, however, keep asserting as before that the meaning of the directive was allegedly wrongly interpreted. By the way, the very fact that U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft designed to use nuclear weapons use regularly and unhindered Japanese ports remains to be the best confirmation of the existence of secret agreements, the newspaper ASAHI writes.

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CSO: 5200/1465

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS ON 30 APRIL NEVADA TEST

Test Announced

LD291033 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 29 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 29 TASS -- It has been officially announced here that the United States will conduct another underground nuclear test codenamed Hardin at the Nevada test site on Thursday, April 30.

Energy department spokesman Jim Boyer has said that the yield of a nuclear device is ten times as high as the one of the A-bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

That would be the sixth officially announced U.S. underground nuclear test since the beginning of the current year.

Test Conducted

LD301507 Moscow TASS in English 1502 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 30 TASS -- An underground nuclear explosion was detonated at the Nevada test site today. A spokesman for the test site information service told TASS that its yield was between 20 and 150 kilotons.

According to the spokesman, the test, code-named Hardin, was connected with armaments.

The latest explosion in Nevada was the United States' 6th officially announced nuclear test this year.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

SEMIPALATINSK TEST 6 MAY--Moscow, 6 May (TASS)--An underground nuclear explosion with a yield of under 20 kilotons was conducted at the testing range in the area of Semipalatinsk in the Soviet Union at 8 hours 05 minutes Moscow time today. The test was staged to check the findings of research into the physics of a nuclear blast. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0615 GMT 6 May 87 LD] /9274

TASS: FRENCH TEST 6 MAY--Paris, 6 May (TASS)--France carried out this year's first underground nuclear test at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific on Wednesday. the FRANCE PRESSE NEWS AGENCY reported from Wellington quoting New Zealand's seismological station. The explosion is measured at five kilotons, a spokesman for the station said. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0625 GMT 6 May 87 LD] /9274

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